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INTRODUCTION
A lot of legal scholarship ponders trademark’s relationship with
other forms of intellectual property (IP).1 This is no surprise.
Trademarks, copyrights, and patents all protect intangible rights.
As their respective legal regimes evolve, their policies may come
into conflict due to overlapping subject matter. The resulting
doctrinal tensions need reconciliation and provide fodder for
analysis.
That said, thinking about trademark boundaries in terms of other
IP laws is a bit odd. Copyrights and patents exist in order to
incentivize invention and expression.2 Trademark performs a
different role. It is more fundamentally regulation of consumer
information.3 As such, it may enjoy a greater kinship with other
consumer information regimes, be they based on private rights of
action, like federal false advertising law,4 or the regulatory
activities of agencies like the Federal Trade Commission.5
1. See, e.g., Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Directing TrafFix: A Comment on the Construction
and Application of Utility Patent Claims in Trade Dress Litigation, 54 FLA. L. REV. 229
(2002); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Concurrence and Convergence of Rights: The Concerns of the
U.S. Supreme Court, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 2004: ARTICLES ON CROSSING
BORDERS: BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND ACTUAL 5 (F. Willem Grosheide & Jan J. Brinkhof eds.,
2005), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&context=
graeme_dinwoodie; Laura A. Heymann, The Trademark/Copyright Divide, 60 SMU L. REV.
55 (2007); Mark P. McKenna, An Alternate Approach to Channeling?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
873 (2009); Gideon Parchomovosky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of
Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455 (2002).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to “promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
3. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879) (rejecting an effort to base
federal trademark law in the incentive-based Intellectual Property Clause, U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8). Future federal efforts, including today’s trademark statute, the Lanham Act,
invoke Congress’s Commerce Clause power. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (“The intent of this
chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by making actionable the
deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce.”).
4. The federal false advertising action is located in the same section of the Lanham Act
as the action for infringement of an unregistered mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
5. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006) (empowering the FTC
to prevent “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce”).
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This Article explores the consequences for trademark of being
just one of many consumer information laws. Some of the issues
addressed by trademark recur across regimes, inviting classi-
fication6 and comparison7 of different approaches to similar
questions. My focus, however, is elsewhere. Rather than asking
whether, for example, the Federal Trade Commission’s definition of
misleading advertising ought to guide parallel assessments in
trademark, or making claims about the nature of misleading
conduct,8 this Article is interested in the consequences for trade-
mark of the fact that multiple regimes answer these questions.
Part I begins the inquiry by describing trademark’s connection
with other consumer information laws. In many cases optimal
trademark policy—by whatever criteria—depends on the state of
play in another regime. This complicates trademark’s development
in multiple ways. It is not simply a problem of determining how
another body of law treats the related issue. Identifying the
relevant parallel regime is not always easy. Indeed, sometimes the
laws most pertinent to the production of consumer information are
more general in nature—think, for example, of the role that simple
trespass law plays in determining what we know about how our
meat is raised—and therefore easy to overlook.
The problem underscores the complexity of the larger “ecosystem”
of generators and users of consumer information and the laws
governing them. The various components of this broader structure
may interact opaquely. The resulting lack of clarity has conse-
quences for trademark’s future development and the question of
how responsibility for that development should be divided between
judges and legislators. The difficulty of crafting rules with an eye
toward interrelated doctrines may be reason to question the wisdom
of a judge-driven, “common law” approach to trademark deci-
sions. Alternatively, courts should look for ways to accommodate
6. See, e.g., Gregory Klass, Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in the Law of Deception, 100
GEO. L.J. 449, 450 (2012) (drawing a distinction between “interpretive, purpose-based, and
causal-predictive” regulatory approaches to preventing deception).
7. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and
False Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1308-09 (2011) (discussing, among other
things, what trademark and false advertising law can learn from each other).
8. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657,
660 (1985).
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consumer information law’s variety by simplifying trademark issues
as much as possible in order to minimize the need for cross-
doctrinal assessments.
The balance of the Article explores one approach to simplifica-
tion. Part II develops the idea that trademark law might benefit
from “offloading” some of its expanding scope to other consumer
information regimes. Claims at trademark’s peripheries often
address subject matter that is the core concern of other causes of
action. Letting such claims into trademark creates several prob-
lems. It risks upsetting settled policy tradeoffs in other bodies of
law, raising accountability issues when those understandings were
the product of political settlement. Importing such claims is also
detrimental to trademark law. Although the external body of law
will have doctrines designed to limit the reach of particular claims,
these limitations may not translate into trademark law. The
imported claim may therefore assume an unexpected scope, free of
the doctrines that would normally cabin its reach. The resulting
instability undermines trademark law’s coherence and transpar-
ency as courts force new claims into now-ill-fitting doctrinal boxes.
Offloading such causes of action from trademark law into more
appropriate regimes offers an avenue for improving the quality of
trademark doctrine. The remainder of Part II gives several
examples while acknowledging some limits to this approach.
I. INTERCONNECTED ISSUE ANALYSIS
Trademark law is just one of many regimes regulating a larger
system of consumer information generation and consumption.
Optimal trademark policy will often depend on how other consumer
information laws operate. This Part provides some examples and
explores the consequences for judicial approaches to the Lanham
Act.
A. Consumer Information Law
Before proceeding, it is worth providing an overview of trademark
law in particular and consumer information law in general. For
present purposes, consumer information law is defined simply as
1434 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1429
the law regulating the production and dissemination of information
relevant to consumers in making purchasing decisions. The
category is broad; the following describes just a sample.
1. Trademark
a. Trademark’s Purpose
Trademarks and servicemarks are used to identify and distin-
guish goods and services while signaling their source.9 Justifica-
tions for legally protecting trademarks generally fall into one of two
camps. The first focuses on the consumer’s interest. Trademark
rights prevent fraud (for example, passing off a product as that of
another) while assisting consumers in finding their preferred
product.10 A consumer reaching for a product may expect it to have
the same source—and therefore the same attributes—as other
goods bearing the same mark that she tried in the past. Consumers
therefore need not expend the same effort—or search costs—to
verify product quality or find their preferred product as they would
in a world without trademark protection.11 The ability to rely on a
trademark has the ancillary benefit of allowing sellers to compete
on the basis of quality. Because consumers may rely on trademarks,
sellers can invest in quality without fear that competitors will copy
their trademarks to undercut them with a similarly labeled
product.12 
Although this latter benefit also promotes consumer welfare, it
is often framed as a benefit afforded by trademark law to sellers.13
This is the second traditional trademark justification. Trademark
law exists to protect the “goodwill” that a seller forms with the
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) .
10. This purpose is noted in the legislative history of the Lanham Act. See S. REP. NO.
79-1333, at 3 (1946), as reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274 (stating that a purpose
of trademark law is to “protect the public so that it may be confident that, in purchasing a
product[,] ... it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get”).
11. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 275-76 (1987).
12. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (“Trade-marks encourage the maintenance of quality by
securing to the producer the benefit of the good reputation which excellence creates.”).
13. Id. at 3.
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consuming public,14 and the trademark cause of action defends it
from misappropriation by others.15
b. Trademark’s Growth
Trademark law has grown in scope and power in recent decades.
A brief description of that expansion follows. More extensive
accounts are available elsewhere.16
Trademark law is traditionally concerned with the deceptive
seller who tricks consumers by mislabeling his goods as someone
else’s.17 Modern trademark law has a lot more on its plate. First, it
polices more than labels. Today’s doctrine largely rejects subject
matter limitations, creating difficulties as creative plaintiffs claim
protection over not only product designs,18 but a range of nontradi-
tional exotic marks such as buildings,19 store décors,20 film scenes,21
and expressive content generally.22
Second, trademarks are more powerful. The trademark cause of
action now reaches beyond the home market of the plaintiff ’s
product.23 Courts will assess likelihood of confusion—the trademark
14. Id. at 5.
15. Id. at 3 (“[W]here the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in
presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from its
misappropriation by pirates and cheats.”).
16. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill
in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 592-615 (2006); J. Thomas McCarthy, Lanham Act
§ 43(a): The Sleeping Giant Is Now Wide Awake, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 46-54 (1996).
17. See, e.g., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412-13 (1916) (“The
essence of the [trademark] wrong consists in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer or
vendor for those of another.”).
18. See, e.g., Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d
206, 211-12 (2d Cir. 2012) (concerning protection for the color of high-heel shoes).
19. See, e.g., Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749,
755 (6th Cir. 1998).
20. See, e.g., Best Cellars, Inc. v. Wine Made Simple, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 60, 71
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
21. See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593, 594-95 (9th Cir.
2000).
22. See generally 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 8:4.50 (4th ed. 2013) (giving examples of subject matter held to be trade
dress). 
23. See generally id. § 24:2 (describing the decline of the requirement that trademark
plaintiffs be in competition with defendants before filing infringement suits).
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liability standard—at times other than the point of sale.24 Pre-sale
and post-sale confusion may create liability even if actual purchas-
ers are not confused.25 Trademark claims need not be restricted to
confusion about a product’s source or origin. They now encompass
confusion of sponsorship and affiliation.26 This concept of “approval”
reaches beyond the notion of standing behind or otherwise vouching
for a product as a franchisor might. Courts entertain claims in
which the alleged confusion is simply that consumers think the
mark holder permitted a reference by the defendant.27
Finally, Congress has created entirely new categories of trade-
mark claims. The federal trademark dilution statute allows owners
of “famous” marks to target activities deemed likely to “blur” or
“tarnish” their marks even if there is no likelihood of consumer
confusion.28 Anti-“cybersquatting” legislation gives trademark
holders the ability to claim domain names that are “confusingly
similar” to their marks.29 Here, too, likelihood of consumer confu-
sion is not required.30
Trademark’s expansion creates a range of problems. Ambitious
plaintiffs threaten competition when they claim trademarks in
functional subject matter,31 interfere with comparative and other
referential advertising by competitors,32 attack innovation in
24. See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1244 (6th Cir. 1991).
25. See, e.g., Hermès Int’l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 108-09 (2d
Cir. 2000) (post-sale confusion case); Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v.
Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975) (early initial interest confusion case).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
27. See, e.g., Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 544 (5th Cir. 1998) (“For
a party to suggest to the public, through its use of another’s mark or a similar mark, that it
has received permission to use the mark on its goods or services suggests approval, and even
endorsement, of the party’s product or service and is a kind of confusion the Lanham Act
prohibits.”).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
29. Id. § 1125(d); see also Neil L. Martin, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act: Empowering Trademark Owners, But Not the Last Word on Domain Name Disputes, 25
J. CORP. L. 591, 593-94 (2000) (exploring the meaning of “cybersquatting”).
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). The provision, passed as the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act (ACPA), gives mark holders the ability to seek in rem relief against domain
names alleged to be confusingly similar to their marks. 
31. See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 23-24 (2000).
32. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1180 (9th Cir.
2010).
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information markets,33 or use immaterial confusion to harass
competitors.34 Likewise, the monopolization of merchandising
markets through trademark rights raises prices by preventing
competition.35 Expansive trademark claims also threaten expressive
activities that employ trademarks.36 All of these criticisms and
others may be found in the large and growing commentary critiqu-
ing trademark’s growth.37
2. Other Private Rights of Action
Many laws regulating producers and users of consumer informa-
tion operate, like trademark, through private rights of action.
Federal false advertising law, for example, targets advertising that
“misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic
origin” of “goods, services, or commercial activities.”38 Liability
generally requires: 
(1) a false or misleading statement of fact about a product; (2)
such statement deceived or had the capacity to deceive a
substantial segment of potential consumers; (3) the deception is
material, in that it is likely to influence the purchasing decision;
(4) the product is in interstate commerce; and (5) the plaintiff
has been or is likely to be injured as a result of the statement.39
33. See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2010).
34. See, e.g., Ga.-Pac. Consumer Prods., LP v. Myers Supply, Inc., 621 F.3d 771, 775-77
(8th Cir. 2010); Ga. Pac. Consumer Prods., LP v. Von Drehle Corp., 618 F.3d 441, 442 (4th
Cir. 2010).
35. See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel
Co., 550 F.3d 465, 479 (5th Cir. 2008) (upholding an infringement finding against apparel
that used plaintiff universities’ color schemes).
36. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 774-75 (8th Cir.
1994) (finding infringement in a mock advertisement depicting altered forms of the
plaintiff’s marks).
37. See, for example, the sources collected and discussed in Michael S. Mireles, Jr.,
Towards Recognizing and Reconciling the Multiplicity of Values and Interests in Trademark
Law, 44 IND. L. REV. 427, 473-88 (2011).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
39. Clock Spring, L.P. v. Wrapmaster, Inc., 560 F.3d 1317, 1329 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(citing Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 2000)).
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Like trademark, the federal false advertising cause of action has
state-law counterparts.40 Other state private rights of action in-
fluencing the production of consumer information are found in
consumer protection statutes, which may also provide private
remedies for individual consumers for false or misleading represen-
tations.41 They are sometimes referred to as little-FTC statutes to
the extent that their ambit coincides with the federal FTC Act.42
Local tort and contract laws also influence consumer information
practices. Beyond consumer remedies for fraud or breach of
contract,43 defamation, trade libel, publicity, and related doctrines
all regulate advertising practices and other communications to
consumers.44
Last, as discussed in greater detail below, a host of legal regimes
that are not focused on consumer information shape its availability
just as much, if not more, than those that are. Antitrust law, for
example, sets rules for the marketplace that affect the freedom of
action for information providers.45 But less encompassing regimes
also play a significant, if often overlooked, role in determining the
types of information that consumers have available to them.46
3. Administrative Regulation
Federal and state administrative agencies and other executive
officials directly regulate consumer information. Most notably, the
Federal Trade Commission has authority under the FTC Act to
40. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2013).
41. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts
Really Little-FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163, 169-73 (2011) (describing various types of
consumer protection acts passed by states, the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and
the Model Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law). 
42. Id. at 171 (noting that provisions of the Model Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law tracked that of the FTC Act, leading them to be referred to as “[l]ittle-FTC
Acts” when adopted by the states).
43. And state and federal laws may dictate the kinds of disclosures necessary as part of
contract terms or warranties. See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-
2312 (2006).
44. For an overview of the various regimes at play in consumer information law, see
generally REBECCA TUSHNET & ERIC GOLDMAN, ADVERTISING AND MARKETING LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS (2012). 
45. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216-17 (2010)
(allowing an antitrust claim against the NFL’s trademark licensing activities to proceed).
46. See infra Part I.C.
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proceed against those committing “unfair and deceptive” practices
in the marketplace.47 Other federal agencies may initiate similar
enforcement proceedings for subject matter within their purview.48
State attorneys general and administrative regimes exercise par-
allel authority.49
Agencies also issue prospective rules.50 Some of them control
what may be brought to market,51 but of interest here are rules
concerning information practices.52 Some such rules control how
those products may be described. For example, the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) regulates when a food may be
labeled “organic,”53 and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
regulates the naming of food ingredients.54 Not all of these interven-
tions are in the form of binding rules. They may exist instead as
agency guidance or recommended best practices.55
4. Interacting Regimes
A lot may be said about the variety of consumer information laws
and their interactions. Some articles focus on cross-cutting
issues—for example, the need to determine what kinds of state-
47. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
48. See, e.g., Press Release, FCC, FCC Proposes $5 Million Forfeiture Regarding Prepaid
Calling Cards (Oct. 2, 2012), available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-proposes-5-million-
forfeiture-regarding-calling-cards.
49. See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, Skechers Will Pay $40 Million to Settle FTC Charges
That It Deceived Consumers with Ads for “Toning Shoes” (May 16, 2012), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/05/consumerrefund.shtm (describing a settlement joined by state
attorneys general who had pursued actions against the company). 
50. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2006).
51. See, e.g., infra note 75 (citing the FDA’s generic drug rules).
52. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (2012) (delineating FCC rules on telemarketing).
53. 7 C.F.R. § 205.800 (2013).
54. See, e.g., Letter from Michael M. Landa, Dir., Ctr. for Food Safety & Applied
Nutrition, Food & Drug Admin., to Audrae Erickson, President, Corn Refiners Assoc. (May
30, 2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/aboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofFoods/CFSAN/
CFSANFOIAElectronicReadingRoom/ucm305226.htm. See generally Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399d).
55. See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, FTC Issues Revised “Green Guides” (Oct. 1, 2012),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/10/greenguides.shtm. Here, too, states may act in
a similar manner, subject to the limitation that any state regime may be preempted by its
federal counterpart if they conflict. See, e.g., In re Aurora Dairy Corp. Organic Milk Mktg.
& Sales Practices Litig., 621 F.3d 781, 796 (8th Cir. 2010).
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ments are misleading.56 Others address the differences between
regimes. This comparative view may produce critiques of a body of
law’s approach to a particular problem or assess the various
regulatory tools that may be calibrated for particular kinds of
deception.57 This Article is less interested in the outcome of such
analyses than the fact that trademark is just one of several
consumer information regimes that must engage them. To that end,
the remainder of this Part examines the interaction of consumer
information regimes—with a focus on trademark law—and what
this interaction suggests about resolving unsettled questions of
trademark doctrine.
B. Simultaneous Analysis
Trademark law has an undeniable policy component. The
trademark cause of action is written in broad text,58 giving parties
to litigation broad leeway to make naked policy appeals to judges.
The development of new advertising tools and marketplaces online
has only increased this temptation.59 Whatever one thinks of this
state of affairs,60 if policy is a relevant battleground in a trademark
case, then preferred outcomes are hard to achieve without assessing
the role of other regimes and institutional actors. Some examples
follow.
1. Keyword Advertising
Sometimes the full policy picture in a debate over trademark’s
proper scope requires the evaluation of a regime that is not before
the court. Many contentious questions of trademark doctrine turn
on the extent to which third parties may use trademarks, which
identify the product’s source, to identify the product’s category.
“PEPSI is better than COKE,” is what trademark law defines as a
56. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 8, at 678 (proposing that advertising be treated as
deceptive “only if it leaves some consumers holding a false belief about a product, and the ad
could be cost-effectively changed to reduce the resulting injury”) (emphasis omitted).
57. See, e.g., Klass, supra note 6, at 450.
58. See infra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
59. See infra Part I.B.1.
60. This subsection is agnostic on that point, but it is taken up in Part I.D.2, infra.
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nominative use.61 The mark is used to refer to the mark holder in
making a relative claim about COKE. This kind of use is well-
established as permissible comparative advertising.62 But it also
communicates other nominative messages—for example, that
PEPSI is in the same product category as Coca-Cola. The legality
of nominative trademark uses outside the comparative advertising
context is unsettled.
Battles over keyword advertising are an example. Keyword
advertising is the practice of purchasing the ability to display
advertising in response to search engine queries.63 So, an airline
might bid on the right to have its advertisements displayed next to
a search for “airplane tickets.” Trademark law gets involved when
the keyword is a mark—for example, “AMERICAN AIRLINES.”64
Plaintiffs objecting to the use of trademarks as keywords and
similar practices sometimes focus on the trademark doctrine of pre-
sale or “initial interest confusion.”65 They contend that any
diversion of potential customers should be actionable, even absent
bait-and-switch or similar tactics.66 Another theory attacks inter-
mediaries like Google when advertising turns out to be for
counterfeit products, claiming that such practices contribute to
infringement or constitute direct infringement in and of itself.67
These efforts have drawn cascades of criticism.68 One attack
focuses on the ability of keyword advertising to expand the range of
consumer choice.69 A trademark is an information-rich term.70 The
advertisement delivered in response to a search for the mark may
efficiently inform consumers of alternative options in the same
61. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307-08 (9th Cir.
1992) (explaining nominative uses of marks).
62. See infra Part II.C.1.
63. See, e.g., Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 150-51 (4th Cir. 2012)
(explaining the practice of keyword advertising and how it relates to trademark law).
64. See id. at 152.
65. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Brookfield Commc’ns Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062-63
(9th Cir. 1999).
67. Rosetta Stone, 676 F.3d at 152.
68. See generally Michael Grynberg, The Road Not Taken: Initial Interest Confusion,
Consumer Search Costs, and the Challenge of the Internet, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97, 130
nn.156-57 (2004) (collecting examples). 
69. Id. at 126-27.
70. Id. at 126 n.144.
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product category.71 So TYLENOL as a keyword may inform con-
sumers of alternative, cheaper sources of acetaminophen.72 Similar
claims pop up in the brick-and-mortar world—for example, when
drug packaging mimics the trade dress of the senior user, while
retaining a distinct word mark.73 Consumers may be able to search
more effectively for competing products by looking for the trade
dress color of the senior user to find chemically identical alterna-
tives.74
In this example, we might want to know what is going on outside
of trademark law. The FDA regulates sellers of generic drugs to
ensure that generic compounds are what they say they are.75 The
argument that competitors should be able to use TYLENOL marks
in a class-identifying manner rests in part on the assumption that
these laws are effective.76 They are, in effect, consumer information
laws, but not laws that courts take time to assess in determining
the state of their trademark complement.77
The fact that not all products have the stakes of pharmaceuticals
further complicates matters. Trademark doctrine generally is not
71. Id. at 126.
72. It is hard for trademark law to accommodate this point without some judicial
innovation, as it has no clear doctrinal fit. Keyword advertising is not clearly a nominative
fair use because there is no explicit reference to the trademark holder. See, e.g., Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 803-05 (9th Cir. 2002) (treating certain website uses as
nominative and others as not). The practice is not a generic use in that the mark itself
continues to identify a particular source rather than a category, though it is used in a
category-defining manner. The same can be said of the functionality defense; although the
mark is being used in a functional way, the use does not fit the terms of the functionality
doctrine. See, e.g., Rosetta Stone, 676 F.3d at 161-63; Michael Grynberg, Things Are Worse
Than We Think: Trademark Defenses in a “Formalist” Age, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 921-
23 (2009) (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of the functionality doctrine problem in
Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2006)).
73. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1037 (2d Cir.
1992); Nicholas Bakalar, The Confusion of Pill Coloring, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2012),
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/31/the-confusion-of-pill-coloring/.
74. See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 973 F.2d at 1042.
75. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585; see also ORANGE BOOK: APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Develop
mentApprovalProcess/ucm079068.htm (last updated Feb. 3, 2012) (explaining statistical
criteria for generic drug equivalence). 
76. Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 11, at 275 (“The fact that two goods have the same
chemical formula does not make them of equal quality to even the most coolly rational
consumer.”).
77. See id.
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granular by product category. What does it mean that there is no
similar regulatory backstop warranting the quality for other
everyday products that also engage in keyword advertising?
Suppose that the product in question is a shampoo with package
coloring resembling HEAD & SHOULDERS, but containing a
different formula. Is that false advertising? Do we want judges to
answer the question before deciding on the trademark status? Or
are the stakes too low?78
To be sure, judges need not delve into these questions. They could
focus solely on the Lanham Act’s text in conjunction with the
traditional scope of trademark doctrine. But to the extent conse-
quences matter, a full picture depends in some part on the state of
external doctrine.79 These are not the sort of arguments that
litigants can be expected to raise reliably nor the generalist courts
to address sua sponte.
2. Merchandising
The so-called “merchandising right” is another contentious
trademark innovation. In a merchandising case, the mark holder
attacks a defendant’s use of the mark as the centerpiece of the
product—for example, a baseball cap with a New York Yankees or
Boston Red Sox logo. On one level, these claims seem a perversion
of trademark law. Purchasers of branded merchandise are unlikely
to use the trademark as a source identifier. Instead, the mark is in
large part the product. Its consumption is largely expressive.
Consumers may be declaring fandom, identification with a geo-
graphic region, participation in a fashion trend, or the like.80 They
are not, however, using the mark to find their preferred source for
78. Cf. Jeremy N. Sheff, Biasing Brands, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1245, 1311 (2011) (describ-
ing ways brands may bias consumer decisions, possibly justifying government interventions
in the market, but observing that “[m]aking these determinations requires empirical study
that is sensitive to the nature of consumer cognition and the idiosyncrasies of particular
markets”).
79. And in the case of drugs, they certainly do. It is hard to imagine judges taking such
a hard line in favor of trademark’s conceptual purity if misformulated drugs were routinely
reaching the marketplace.
80. Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60,
101 (2008).
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the branded merchandise—for example, the physical manufacturer
of the cap, sweatshirt, or jersey.
That said, a species of trademark harm is possible. If one
consumer motivation is to support the brand’s proprietor, as
opposed to a third party, then a merchandising right may offer
some protection to these consumers, albeit at the expense of
monopoly rents extracted from others.81 But we might wonder if the
trademark game is worth the candle in light of how much
trademark-irrelevant conduct these claims would sweep up.82
Assessing that harm requires considering other remedies. We
might see the issue as one of false advertising—whether the seller
of branded merchandise has claimed to be officially authorized by
the brand’s originator (or whether the merchandise is presented in
a manner that suggests official authorization) and whether that
claim is material.83 Misrepresentations of this sort could be targeted
by competitors in a false advertising suit, consumers acting under
state law, or regulatory agencies. Before deciding that false claims
of this nature should be handled by trademark law and its
disclaimer precedents, courts could first ask whether the tools
available in these alternative regimes are lacking.
3. Counterfeits and What to Do About Them
One could say the same about the development of trademark
remedies for post-sale confusion, which bases liability on the
prospect that third parties may be mistaken after the sale about the
relationship between a trademark holder and a product.84 
81. Id. On this view, one might see team hats with differing logos as “competing” for the
fan’s support dollars. Of course, this competition may not in fact exist. See Am. Needle, Inc.
v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2214 (2010) (“[T]he record indicates that most of
the revenues generated by NFLP [National Football League Properties, which licenses marks
of the league’s teams] are shared by the teams on an equal basis.”).
82. Much would depend on our assumption of the respective base rates of consumers in
either category. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 7, at 1334-36 (discussing trademark rules as
explicable as a form of Bayesian analysis).
83. This is not to deny that sponsorship claims are within the core modern trademark
cause of action. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). Rather, it is to argue that trademark
encompasses a particular meaning of sponsorship—that of standing behind or vouching for
a product’s quality and not as simply giving permission to be referred to by a third party. See
Grynberg, supra note 72, at 964-65.
84. See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1244-45 (6th Cir. 1991).
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The theory of harm underlying these actions is unsettled. One
approach warns that third parties may view a shoddy knockoff and
blame the trademark holder for its low quality, resulting in
unearned harm to the mark holder’s goodwill.85 This argument
seems inconsistent with everyday experience. Branded merchandise
gets old, too, and trademark holders sometimes sell goods to
consumers who mistreat them. Yet we somehow carry on.
Other cases hone in on the “wrong” of consumers who purchase
apparent prestige goods on the cheap to misrepresent their wealth,
status, or the like.86 The confused parties are would-be snobs who
might make the mistake of being impressed by the poseurs.87
Trademark law is not, however, a rulebook for status competition
among consumers. Several commentators make the move from here
to an incentive theory leavened with a concern for the snobs,
reasoning that a post-sale confusion action is necessary to maintain
the market in prestige goods.88 This still begs the question of
whether creating artificial scarcity to promote specific markets is
an appropriate trademark goal.89
A final theory, closer to the core trademark cause of action, is
more along the lines of a contributory trademark infringement
claim. We worry not that the seller of a counterfeit or knockoff will
deceive the buyer, but rather that the buyer will confuse future
downstream purchasers. Waiting for those sales may be impractica-
ble. There may be too many secondary sellers to chase; they may be
hard to find; or they may be acting innocently, making the trade-
mark holder reluctant to pursue them even if pursuit were possible.
It is far easier to target the defendant who knew of and facilitated
these problems.90
85. Id. at 1275.
86. See, e.g., Hermès Int’l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Avenue, Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 108-09
(2d Cir. 2000).
87. Id. at 108.
88. E.g., Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 970 (1993)
(“Whatever pleasure people get from wearing an image-enhancing product is diminished if
everyone else can get the same thing at a discount store.”).
89. On this line of thinking, the post-sale remedy is not a market-neutral move because
it is an expansion of trademark law designed to protect and promote a specific class of
market.
90. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982) (recognizing
liability for one who “intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark” or “continues
to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark
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Any one of these rationales carries costs. Post-sale confusion
lends itself to abusive litigation by market incumbents against
rivals. Stopping counterfeit drugs is all well and good. If one is not
careful, however, the post-sale theory could be used for more
questionable purposes, like creating barriers to entry in the paper
towel market.91 Evaluating the tradeoff requires assessing not only
alternative doctrines within trademark law—such as contributory
infringement and the statutory counterfeiting cause of action—but
also the role of external enforcers like the FTC or, in the case of
drugs, the FDA.92 If the meaningful harms of counterfeiting are
addressed elsewhere, then we might tolerate the pain, such as it is,
of sometimes being mistaken when we think we see a Ferrari.93 And
even if these harms are inadequately addressed elsewhere, we
might ask whether external doctrines are capable of handling the
potential fallout of an expanded trademark cause of action.94
4. Policy Priorities
The post-sale confusion example illustrates that assessing other
consumer information regimes may illuminate whether certain
problems should be addressed by trademark law. By the same
infringement”). See generally Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769, 785
(2012) (discussing “downstream confusion”).
91. No, really. See Ga.-Pac. Consumer Prods., LP v. Myers Supply, Inc., 621 F.3d 771 (8th
Cir. 2010); Ga. Pac. Consumer Prods., LP v. Von Drehle Corp., 618 F.3d 441 (4th Cir. 2010).
92. See supra note 75 and accompanying text; infra note 238 and accompanying text.
93. See Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1237-38 (6th Cir. 1991). To be
sure, there are other grounds on which to argue against this and other developments. One
could reject the premise that discussion of post-sale confusion has anything to do with
trademark law (for example, that the post-sale remedy stretches trademark so far beyond
its historical baseline as to be unrecognizable). In the cases in which policy discussions like
those in the text are relevant, that argument has already been lost.
94. The degree to which applications of trademark law interfere with the marketplace
is a frequent topic of scholarly attention. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark
Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999). Antitrust law is not the only potential external check
to trademark. In Von Drehle, a maker of paper towels successfully pursued a post-sale
confusion theory against a competitor who made towels that could be stuffed in Georgia
Pacific’s dispensers. 618 F.3d at 454-55. The dispensers were leased, and the lessees agreed
to not use non-Georgia Pacific toweling in the dispensers. Id. at 444-45. The court
nonetheless held that this contractual violation could amount to trademark infringement as
well. Id. at 455. In doing so, the Fourth Circuit also rejected the defendant’s effort to claim
that the lease agreements violated North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices
Act. Id. at 457-58.
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token, looking at how particular issues play out across doctrines
may help identify policy priorities for trademark law’s future
development.
a. Geographical Indications
The Federal Circuit’s treatment of geographic marks is a blunt
example of courts refusing to acknowledge extra-trademark
resolutions of trademark-related issues.95 Geographical Indications
(GIs) identify a good as coming from a particular area “where a
given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is
essentially attributable to its geographical origin.”96 In the United
States, their protection is mostly tied to the normal operation of
trademark law. The Lanham Act provides for certification and
collective marks, which may be used to meet some of the demand
for GIs.97 Trademark law bolsters the strength of these signals by
otherwise limiting the use of place names as trademarks. Because
of the perceived danger of consumer deception in marks that falsely
suggest a goods/place association, both the common law and the
Lanham Act impose barriers to using geographically descriptive
terms as marks.98
The extent to which U.S. law should go further than it does in
protecting GIs is controversial,99 implicating traditional consumer
protection concerns, but also reaching issues of fair trade, local
autonomy, and barriers to market entry.100 To give a popular
example, some believe that the Parmigiano-Reggiano label should
be exclusive to a particular style of cheese, made in a particular
way, in a particular part of Italy.101 Every one of those attrib-
utes—style, process, and region—may be important to consumers,
95. See, e.g., In re Cal. Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
96. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 22(1), Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299.
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining certification and collective marks).
98. See, e.g., id. § 1052(e)(2),(3); Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311 (1871).
99. The United States has an appellations system for wine administered by the Alcohol
and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau. See generally 27 C.F.R. § 4.25 (2013) (setting rules for
appellations of origin); id. § 9.21-.218 (listing approved American Viticultural Areas). 
100. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate About
Geographical Indications, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 299 (2006). 
101. See, e.g., PARMIGIANO-REGGIANO, Registration No. 3,445,305 (certification mark).
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be it for reasons of experience or ideology, creating the potential for
deception if the label is used loosely. For others, “parmesan” cheese
is just the generic name of a cheese style and lacks geographic
significance. Trademark law denies protection to generic marks lest
sellers be unable to truthfully describe their products in a manner
accessible to consumers.102
Looking to the consumer perspective does not offer any simple
resolutions to the conflict. Many consumers do care about designa-
tions of regional origin and/or whether their product is an “authen-
tic” one made in the traditional way. Others are happy to know that
they receive the same kind of product and will happily trade the
perception of authenticity, itself a contestable and loaded term, for
the more robust price competition made possible by opening the
market to competitors in multiple regions.103
Politics may resolve these battles. As part of the implementation
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Congress
altered the rules surrounding registration of geographic marks.104
The Lanham Act excludes certain mark categories from trademark
registration.105 Some exclusions may be overcome. Descriptive
marks—for example, RELIABLE cars—cannot be registered unless
the applicant demonstrates that consumers have come to see the
term as performing a source-identifying function—in other words,
that the mark has “secondary meaning.”106 Other exclusions, like
the bar against deceptive marks—for example, a plastic knife that
102. See, e.g., Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc. 781 F.2d 604, 609 (7th Cir. 1986)
(“[Allowing trademarks in generic words] would make it difficult for competitors to market
their own brands of the same product. Imagine being forbidden to describe a Chevrolet as a
‘car’ or an ‘automobile’ because Ford or Chrysler or Volvo had trademarked these generic
words.”).
103. And as Professor Tushnet points out, any decisions to favor one side or the other will
inevitably help shape consumer perceptions. Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the
Meaning of “False” Is: Falsity and Misleadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 227, 250 (2007). 
104. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182,
107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473 (2006)).
105. Although not required for trademark protection, registration confers certain benefits,
including nationwide priority to the trademark and a presumption of ownership and validity.
15 U.S.C. § 1057 (2006).
106. Id. § 1052(f).
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looks metallic and is branded STEEL—cannot be surmounted
regardless of consumer perception.107
The NAFTA amendments sought to expand the class of perpet-
ual preclusion. Prior to the amendment, one could register marks
that were “primarily geographically descriptive” or “deceptively
misdescriptive” upon showing secondary meaning.108 The amend-
ment shifted marks that are “primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive” into the category of wholly impossible to register
marks.109 Rather than acknowledge the resolution of the consumer
information issue at the treaty and treaty-implementation levels,
the Federal Circuit maintained a studied obliviousness to the
purpose of the amendment and the question that it sought to
resolve.110 The court instead gave the amendment a strained
reading in an effort to maintain the status quo.111
b. Thinking Small
A variety of consumer information regimes all collectively
regulate and shape what might be termed an “ecosystem” of
107. Id. § 1052(a).
108. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act § 333(a).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(3).
110. See In re Cal. Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
111. See id. at 1340, 1343. Specifically, Congress changed the statute such that deceptively
misdescriptive geographic marks, unlike deceptively misdescriptive marks in general, could
never be registered. Id. at 1339. Deceptively misdescriptive marks, by contrast, may be
registered with secondary meaning. 15 U.S.C. § 1052. Deceptively misdescriptive marks are
distinguished from deceptive marks based on the materiality of the term. See In re Budge
Mfg. Co., 857 F.2d 773, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1988). If consumers care about whether a product has
the attribute falsely claimed by the mark, then the registration is deceptive and barred by
§ 1052(a). Reading these terms together, therefore, suggests that Congress sought to
distinguish between two kinds of deceptively misdescriptive marks. Deceptively
misdescriptive marks generally can be registered with secondary meaning unless they are
geographic marks.
The Federal Circuit decided instead that Congress’s silent purpose was to change the
meaning of “deceptively misdescriptive” with respect to geographic marks. Cal. Innovations,
329 F.3d at 1339. Because such marks may not be registered, the court read a materiality
component into the statutory definition of geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks.
Id. at 1340. In other words, Congress wrote a statute that changed the treatment of a defined
class of potential marks. The Federal Circuit took the change in treatment to infer that
Congress had actually wanted to redefine the class—to change the existing meaning of
deceptively misdescriptive when applied to geographic marks but not when applied to
nongeographic marks. See id. at 1341. Strained indeed. 
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information in which producers and consumers of information
interact. Examining this larger whole may suggest policy consider-
ations applicable to particular trademark disputes. The following
outlines one possible example that ties a trademark licensing issue
to the challenges faced by small sellers across markets and the
consumer information doctrines that regulate them.
Trademark law has an uneasy relationship with licensing. By its
nature, licensing weakens a trademark’s signal. Instead of a single
source, now others use the licensed mark to communicate messages.
At the same time, many industries such as fast food are dominated
by locally owned franchises in a relationship with a national
corporate licensor. Trademark law has made its peace with
franchising,112 but careless licensing may still result in the loss of
a mark. Because a mark is supposed to identify and distinguish
goods and services from one another, courts expect licensors to
exercise quality control over their licensees, protecting some kind
of steady signal from the mark.113 Failure to do so may lead to a
court finding that the mark has been abandoned.114
With this backdrop, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Freecy-
cleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network appears unsurprising.115
“Freecycling” is the practice of giving usable goods to strangers who
continue to use them as before; the items are both free and
(re)cycled, thus the term.116 “The Freecycle Network” (TFN) is a
nonprofit organization that promotes freecycling in part by encour-
aging a network of like-minded groups. It licensed its marks to
another freecycling group with the caveat “just don’t use it for
112. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 32 n.5 (2003)
(discussing pre-amendment judicial treatment of franchising arrangements and the
amendment’s clarification that trademarks could be used in franchising relationships).
113. See, e.g., Draeger Oil Co. v. Uno-Ven Co., 314 F.3d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The
economic function of a trademark is to provide the consuming public with a concise and
unequivocal signal of the trademarked product’s source and character, and that function is
thwarted if the quality and uniformity of the trademarked product are allowed to vary
significantly without notice to the consumer.”) (citation omitted); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s
Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959) (“[U]nless the licensor exercises
supervision and control over the operations of its licensees the risk that the public will be
unwittingly deceived will be increased and this is precisely what the [Lanham] Act is in part
designed to prevent.”).
114. Dawn Donut Co., 267 F.2d at 367.
115. 626 F.3d 509 (9th Cir. 2010).
116. Id. at 512.
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commercial purposes.”117 The permission did not provide for quality
control or other supervision.118 When the relationship fell apart,119
the court held this loose affiliation was in the wheelhouse of the
trademark abandonment doctrine.120 TFN’s lack of supervision
terminated its rights to control the Freecycle name.121
As a matter of traditional doctrine, this all makes sense. That
said, the court’s refusal to provide any leeway reflecting the nature
of the parties involved is interesting. The TFNs of the world may
lack the know-how or resources of trademark law’s traditional
licensor. Their actions may be commercial, but they often exist on
the outskirts of commerce and maintain relationships governed by
the norms of informal affiliations rather than the requirements of
arms-length business transactions. But many consumers seek
precisely this kind of market—think of volunteer-driven food
cooperatives or small organic farms.
It is arguable that trademark law should accommodate these
informal relationships. Competition exists not only between
marketplace actors but also between markets themselves. A
consumer needing a product may elect to participate in the cash
economy or may choose instead the informal relationships offered
by freecycling. To the extent that trademark law exists to facilitate
commerce, denying its full benefits to one form of market over
another might be seen as a form of picking winners rather than
letting consumers decide.122
117. Id. at 513.
118. Id. at 517.
119. The licensee brought a declaratory judgment action of noninfringement and moved
for summary judgment based on naked licensing. Id. at 514.
120. Id. at 517.
121. The court rejected the licensor’s contention that its “Keep it Free, Legal, and
Appropriate for all Ages” standard sufficed as control, and found that requirement was not
in any case a control (actual or otherwise) over the quality of the licensee’s service. Id. 
122. This point should not be oversold—at least not without a more rigorous analysis of
the tradeoffs than the brief consideration above provides. In many contexts there may be
sound policy reasons for favoring traditional commercial markets over their informal
counterparts. The costs to the broader stability of trademark law also may not justify
tailoring general rules to narrow contexts. Finally, the claim that trademark law should
accommodate a type of market by adjusting its doctrine could also be seen as seeking a
special benefit for a particular market class rather than promoting efficient market operation
generally. Compare supra note 89 and accompanying text for the possibility that I am being
inconsistent about this issue in even raising the possibility of accommodating informal
markets.
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The Ninth Circuit’s implicit answer in Freecycle is that these
concerns do not belong in trademark law. Maybe not.123 Two
responsive points are nonetheless worth considering. First, the
licensee’s use of the mark creates the potential for confusion as to
the source of services, which is the harm traditionally at trade-
mark’s core.124 Second, other consumer information regimes may be
unable to fill the gap revealed by Freecycle. One can make the case
that small producers or competitors in niche or informal markets
are systematically disadvantaged across multiple bodies of law with
respect to their ability to generate consumer information.
c. Thinking Large
To illustrate, let us shift from used household items to the
problem of the “artisanal” food producer who competes with “big
agriculture.” These are both contested, loaded terms, but for
present purposes let us say that the former relies on consumers
interested in supporting food production contextually defined as
small-scale, “local,” and “sustainable” and generally avoiding
industrial farming practices. Demand for food that can be so
characterized now sustains a multi-billion dollar market that
larger, corporate sellers naturally (and legitimately) want to
reach.125 Because the terms have no fixed meaning, however, they
are a natural subject of promotional efforts at definition. Economi-
cally marginal players will be at an obvious disadvantage at
influencing public meaning through advertising campaigns.
Existing consumer information regimes regulating efforts to
create and mold public meaning may not correct the imbalance. The
USDA regulations controlling the word “organic,”126 for example,
have been criticized on multiple fronts. Some accuse them of being
123. See infra Part II.
124. Note, however, that other trademark doctrines may well have cut against the senior
mark holder in this case. The term “freecycling” is arguably generic and should be generally
available.
125. According to the Organic Trade Association, “U.S. sales of organic food and beverages
have grown from $1 billion in 1990 to $26.7 billion in 2010.” Industry Statistics and Projected
Growth, ORGANIC TRADE ASS’N, http://www.ota.com/organic/mt/business.html (last updated
June 8, 2011). 
126. Organic Foods Production Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6523 (2012).
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too lenient to industrial practices.127 Others say they impose
stringent record-keeping requirements, complicating compliance for
smaller actors.128
Whatever the accuracy of either criticism, neither is surprising.
When dealing with regulators, smaller actors may be at a disadvan-
tage when compared to better-funded competitors who can afford
lobbying expertise and benefit from regulatory capture. An
extensive literature predicts that smaller actors will be less able to
secure advantageous definitions of terms like “organic” or otherwise
lobby for relative advantages in proceedings shaping the market for
meaning.129
Things may not be easier when regulating by private rights of
action. Here, too, being small may present disadvantages. Free
rider problems interfere with the initiation of suits.130 Any misrep-
resentation by the larger advertiser may only inflict a small amount
of harm on any particular smaller competitor. Each single plaintiff
may therefore lack the incentive to mount a costly litigation,
especially when the benefits of such litigation would be spread
127. See, e.g., Ariele Lessing, A Supplemental Labeling Regime for Organic Products: How
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Hampers a Market Solution to an Organic Transparency
Problem, 18 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 415, 441-50 (2011); Chenglin Liu, Is “USDA
ORGANIC” A Seal of Deceit?: The Pitfalls of USDA Certified Organics Produced in the United
States, China, and Beyond, 47 STAN. J. INT’L L. 333 (2011); Sheila Rodriguez, The Morally
Informed Consumer: Examining Animal Welfare Claims on Egg Labels, 30 TEMP. J. SCI.
TECH. & ENVTL. L. 51, 73 (2011) (“Temporary confinement [of poultry] is permitted. Some
certifying agents have used this loophole to keep birds confined indoors most or all of the
time, sometimes in barns holding thousands of birds.”) (footnote omitted).
128. See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki, Food, Law & the Environment: Informational and
Structural Changes for a Sustainable Food System, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 263, 278 (2011)
(“While the costs or organic certification are expensive, they are not prohibitive, but the costs
of monitoring and record-keeping may be the real barriers to entry. For example, applicants
for certification must keep accurate post-certification records for five years concerning the
production, harvesting, and handling of agricultural products that are to be sold as organic.”). 
129. See generally, e.g., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE:
A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12-37 (1991) (discussing the role of powerful interest groups in
American law making). And in practice, the power of industry groups to outsize smaller
actors in public discussions of food policy is hard to miss. See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Retracting
a Plug for Meatless Mondays, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/
26/us/usda-newsletter-retracts-a-meatless-mondays-plug.html?_r=0. 
130. See Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1080
(2012) (“A plaintiff may ... defect to free rides on investments made by others, such as
through nonmutual offensive issue preclusion or through reliance on the precedent or
findings established in other cases.”). 
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among participating and nonparticipating sellers alike, creating a
disincentive to move first.131
Large producers, by contrast, have ample incentive to initiate
suits to shape the information market. Monsanto, for example,
markets hormone treatments for cows to stimulate milk production.
Having secured from the FDA a favorable statement on labeling
requirements for milk from treated cows, the company brought false
advertising suits against producers who sought to advertise their
milk as being the product of untreated cows.132
Doctrine may reflect the advantages of size. Courts interpret the
standing provision of the Lanham Act’s false advertising cause of
action narrowly and impose prudential standing requirements that
threaten to screen smaller competitors.133 Some courts have gone
quite far, with opinions suggesting that only market leaders have
clear standing to sue for false advertising.134 State consumer
protection and unfair trade practice laws, assuming they are open
to competitor suits, may duplicate this effect.135
All of this is to say that small producers may face challenges
across the consumer information landscape. If so, there may be a
case for considering these challenges with respect to open questions
in trademark law. Affiliation arrangements could provide a way to
counteract the disadvantages of size in disseminating consumer
131. Cf. id.; David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for
Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 852-53 (2002) (discussing differing incentives of
individual plaintiffs and class defendants in mass tort litigation).
132. Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 569-74 (2004).
133. Several circuits now use multifactor prudential standing tests that threaten to
exclude smaller competitors and those who cannot trace a precise, quantifiable harm from
the defendant’s conduct. See, e.g., Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 489 F.3d
1156, 1163-64 (11th Cir. 2007) (assessing standing based on “(1) The nature of the plaintiff ’s
alleged injury: Is the injury of a type that Congress sought to redress in providing a private
remedy for violations of the [Lanham Act]?[;] (2) The directness or indirectness of the
asserted injury[;] (3) The proximity or remoteness of the party to the alleged injurious
conduct[;] (4) The speculativeness of the damages claim[;] (5) The risk of duplicative damages
or complexity in apportioning damages”) (first alteration in original). See generally Tushnet,
supra note 7, at 1378.
134. See sources cited supra note 133. The issue of standing under the Lanham Act for
false advertising claims is now pending before the Supreme Court. Static Control
Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 697 F.3d 387, cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2766 (2013).
135. See generally TUSHNET & GOLDMAN, supra note 44, at 384-85 (discussing standing
under state unfair and deceptive acts statutes).
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information. The policy merits of relaxing an oversight requirement
developed for more traditional, larger business actors may seem
stronger when taking account of asymmetries in the information
landscape in total.136
d. Certifying
Just as categories of producers may present particular chal-
lenges, so too might types of information. Douglas Kysar argues
that the process/product distinction generates problems by creating
difficulties for regulators who want to mandate disclosure of the
process by which a product is made rather than its contents.137 The
experience with disclosures for milk coming from rBST-treated cows
illustrates the problem. The Second Circuit found that mandating
disclosure of treatment violated the First Amendment due to the
absence of an immediate health case (for human consumers)
against milk from treated cows.138 But voluntary advertising by
milk distributors who promise to offer only milk from untreated
cows has faced false advertising challenges for making an implicit
claim that such milk is safer than its treated alternative.139
Leaving aside the prospect that there may actually be health
differences between the milk varieties,140 it is an error to assume
that process information is not material to consumers, even if the
final product is unaffected. Purchasers may want their milk cows
untreated because of views on industrial farming, small farmers, or
bovine welfare. Organic food may be appealing for reasons other
than the nutritional or taste differences, if any, between organic
136. This is not a “small equals good, big equals bad” argument. Rather it is an
observation that asymmetries between large and small players may play out across multiple
doctrines. To the extent these asymmetries matter, the inability to act in one regime may
counsel action in the trademark realm.
137. Kysar, supra note 132, at 569-79.
138. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996).
139. Kysar, supra note 132, at 573-74 (discussing Monsanto’s efforts to prevent advertising
of untreated dairy cows); see also Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628 (6th Cir.
2010) (reviewing a state regulation to control advertising stating that dairy cows were
untreated).
140. Judge Leval, dissenting in Amestoy, argued that the fact that current science reveals
no health dangers does not make caution per se irrational, noting that cigarettes were once
believed safe and that drugs are often discovered to have previously unknown risks after pre-
approval study and testing. Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 77 (Leval, J., dissenting). 
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and conventional agriculture.141 Prevailing labor conditions in one
nation may convince consumers to pay a premium for products
sourced from another. Many will not buy tuna without a dolphin-
safe label. And so on.
Difficulties with the process/product divide under other consumer
information regimes place pressure on the trademark alterna-
tive—the use of certification and collective marks.142 These marks
have the potential to address both of the problems of the last two
subparts. They provide a way for smaller actors to affiliate, and
they allow certification that their goods are produced by a particu-
lar process.
But the trademark solution may not work. Collective action
problems may prevent formation of a certifying body, but such a
body is necessary because trademark law objects to entities that
wear the hats of both certifier and certified.143 Any certifying entity,
moreover, must compete with everyday advertising and other
certification marks. A mark may only convey so much information,
moreover, and consumers may not educate themselves on the
precise meaning of a certifier’s mark.144
Here again the role of other consumer information actors
matters. The noise of other marks may dilute the strength of the
141. This is a point of controversy, see, for example, Crystal Smith-Spangler et al., Are
Organic Foods Safer or Healthier Than Conventional Alternatives?: A Systematic Review, 157
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 348 (2012), though health is not the whole of the case for organics.
See, e.g., Brian Fung, Organic Food Isn’t More Nutritious, But That Isn’t the Point, THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 4, 2012, 2:19 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/09/
organic-food-isnt-more-nutritious-but-that-isnt-the-point/261929/ (“For all the attention
devoted to the ways organic is better for you, we should remember that organic began chiefly
as an argument about the environment.”).
142. A certification mark is a mark used “to certify regional or other origin, material, mode
of manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of such person’s goods or services
or that the work or labor on the goods or services was performed by members of a union or
other organization.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). A collective mark is one “used by the members
of a cooperative, an association, or other collective group or organization.” Id.
143. Id. § 1064 (allowing for cancellation in such cases). The FTC takes a dim view of the
practice as well. See 16 C.F.R. § 260.6 (2013). See generally Press Release, FTC, supra note
55. 
144. Michael V. Laric & Dan Sarel, Consumer (Mis)Perceptions and Usage of Third Party
Certification Marks, 1972 and 1980: Did Public Policy Have an Impact?, 45 J. MARKETING
135 (1981) (arguing that changes in FTC regulation that altered the meaning of certifications
did not cure consumer misperceptions of what marks meant); id. at 141 (“This study
reaffirms previous findings indicating an absence of efforts, on the part of consumers, to
determine the actual (correct) meaning of information content.”).
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certification signal.145 Even if these competing marks break the
rules of trademark certification, the medicine—loss of mark
rights—does not treat the symptom of added marketplace noise.
Losing mark exclusivity does not surrender the right of use. Indeed,
for sellers seeking to pass themselves off as certified by third
parties, the lack of meaning in a certification mark may be a
feature, not a bug.
Other actors and regimes must come into play. Antitrust law may
affect the number of certifiers in the market or their ability to
standardize certification signals.146 To the extent that a certifier
certifies carelessly, it may be difficult to secure any remedy with
bite. Private causes of action face many of the challenges described
above along with spillovers from other consumer information
regimes.147
That may leave government regulators to fill the role of ensuring
that a certification signal means something. The effectiveness of
such efforts on consumer perception is debatable,148 as is their effect
on the information market generally.149
145. One certifying body published a report surveying “greenwashing” activities and
found increasing use of deceptive environmental labeling. TERRACHOICE, THE SINS OF
GREENWASHING: HOME AND FAMILY EDITION 20 (2010), available at http://sinsofgreenwash
ing.org/findings/greenwashing-report-2010/ (“More than 32% of ‘greener’ products found in
this study carried such a fake label.”). Moreover, false labels are easy to find and purchase
online. Id.; see also Jonathan M. Barnett, Intermediaries Revisited: Is Efficient Certification
Consistent with Profit Maximization?, 37 J. CORP. L. 475, 491 (2012) (“A recurrent complaint
in immature certification markets is an excessive number of certification standards or
entities, resulting in consumer confusion, certifier laxity, or compliance burdens for certified
entities.”); Margaret Chon, Marks of Rectitude, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2311, 2332, 2343-44
(2009) (noting problems of unclear standards and information clutter).
146. See, e.g., Chon, supra note 145, at 2333 (“Outside of intergovernmental cooperation,
standards may coalesce when a single standard-setting firm becomes dominant or if firms
are encouraged to cooperate toward umbrella standards in the public interest (with or
without the cooperation of a public agency) without fear of being accused of anticompetitive
conduct.”) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (2006), which dictates that the activities of standards
setters are to be evaluated under antitrust’s rule of reason, and not judged per se illegal).
147. For example, federal regimes may raise preemption issues for state claims. See, e.g.,
In re Aurora Dairy Corp. Organic Milk Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 621 F.3d 781, 796 (8th
Cir. 2010) (dismissing claim against certifier of organic status in light of its participation in
federal organic program).
148. See Laric & Sarel, supra note 144, at 141.
149. Professor Barnett proposes a model explaining why certifiers may fail, offering a
“certification paradox”: “the entry-protected conditions that induce dominant certifiers to
incur the costs of accumulating and maintaining reputational capital are the same conditions
that invite intermediary shirking that places that capital at risk.” Barnett, supra note 145,
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A simple trademark issue—should licensing standards for
nonprofit affiliation groups be relaxed—actually implicates issues
that cut across consumer information regimes. It is unrealistic to
expect the Ninth Circuit to have pursued the questions raised in
this subsection or to assume that doing so would have produced
another result. Every step of the discussion above is debatable.
Someone who thinks that we should not worry about the problems
of the small scale or the local would be more likely to focus on other
points of doctrine (for example, the question whether the FTC
presents too onerous a burden for the larger players that are more
likely to attract its attention). The point is to note that a full policy
analysis is an inherently complex enterprise.
5. Who Is the Reasonable Consumer?
Developments in other consumer information regimes may
directly bear on the analysis of a trademark case. Much of trade-
mark law depends on what consumers know. As noted above, some
marks need secondary meaning for protection.150 Others lose
protection if they become generic, that is, if consumers come to see
them as performing a category-identifying, rather than a source-
identifying, function.151 Both inquiries are going to be shaped in
part by the advertising that consumers see.152
Trademark’s multifactor likelihood-of-confusion test provides a
stage for the results. In evaluating likelihood of confusion, courts
at 522. But that in and of itself does not necessarily justify regulatory intervention.
“Regulatory action to influence certifier conduct or expand competitive threats may
overestimate users’ demand for informational accuracy or unduly erode the ‘rent cushion’
that enables certifiers to recoup investments in accruing reputational capital, in each case
discouraging rather than encouraging certification efforts.” Id.
150. See supra notes 106, 111 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1127(2) (2006) (providing that marks are abandoned when “any
course of conduct of the owner ... causes the mark to become the generic name for the goods
or services”).
152. Courts generally consider advertising to be circumstantial evidence that the mark
has secondary meaning. See, e.g., Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imp. & Exps., Inc., 270
F.3d 298, 311-12 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding secondary meaning shown by: “1. direct consumer
testimony; 2. consumer surveys; 3. exclusivity, length, and manner of use; 4. amount and
manner of advertising; 5. amount of sales and number of customers; 6. established place in
the market; and 7. proof of intentional copying”).
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assess a range of factors believed to bear on the question.153 One
factor considers whether consumers within the relevant market are
sophisticated and careful.154 This factor can be manipulated,155 in
part because it is highly contextual, depending on the information
environment in which consumers move.
Other consumer information regimes shape that environment.
Defining how careful a consumer is is hard to separate from a policy
or normative choice about how careful a consumer should be.
Confusion is inevitable. The question is how much of it we need to
target or tolerate in service of our conflicting normative and policy
goals. Courts have a variety of devices to do so. They can dismiss
confusion as being the product of unreasonable consumers.156 Or
they may consider it de minimis.157 Perhaps the observed confusion
on a survey does not rise enough above background noise, or the
survey is somehow flawed.158 Perhaps the wrong people are
confused, or they are insufficiently careful.159 Maybe consumers in
a particular market “know” what to expect from certain kinds of
advertising behavior because judges say they do.160 Or maybe
confusion is just impossible because courts think that to hold
otherwise would allow a trademark to reach too far.161
153. Factors common to every judicial circuit include the existence of actual confusion and
mark similarity. There is a fair amount of convergence in the factors used from circuit to
circuit. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, §§ 24:30-:43.
154. All circuits contain a variant on this factor. Id.
155. See, e.g., id. § 23:92 (“[W]hen the court wants to find no infringement, it says that the
average buyer is cautious and careful and would never be confused. But if the judge thinks
there is infringement, ... the average buyer is gullible and ... easily confused by the similar
marks.”). Consider bubblegum, a cheap item purchased by children. Does that mean that
consumers are unsophisticated? Or do we assume the opposite—that children know their
gum and are careful with their purchases given their often limited disposable income?
156. Cf. August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Many
consumers are ignorant or inattentive, so some are bound to misunderstand no matter how
careful a producer is.”).
157. See, e.g., King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1092
(10th Cir. 1999).
158. 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 32:87. 
159. See, e.g., 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 23:13 (listing examples of actual confusion
being dismissed as carelessness by confused party).
160. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir.
2010).
161. See, e.g., Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d
206, 228 (2d Cir. 2012).
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Decisions on when to use these kinds of devices reflect judgments
of what consumers should believe or evaluations of the value of a
defendant’s conduct.162 Those views, in turn, will be affected by the
ease with which consumers are able to inform themselves of the
“truth” of any given situation. That inquiry cannot be made from a
perspective that is solely internal to trademark law. We need to
know how available consumer information is generally.
For example, several cases considering trademarks as domain
names take the view that Internet consumers are aware that many
trademark-related domain names are not necessarily affiliated with
the trademark holder.163 At the same time, they maintain that
consumers still expect TRADEMARK.com to take one to the website
of the trademark holder.164 Both beliefs are in part artifacts of law
(both private and public) that has permitted some use of trade-
marks in domain names while reserving to the trademark holder
control of TRADEMARK.com in most cases.165
But these beliefs also reflect the actions of third-party actors—in
this case, search engines that diminished the perceived risk that
consumers would use trademarks to guess a domain name to find
a trademark holder and be taken to the wrong site. Quick and
accurate answers are now more readily available by other means.
This reflects an important point. The consumer information
system is also shaped in large part by actors who are not traditional
consumer information providers, and their actions may be guided
by laws that are not consumer information regimes as traditionally
conceived. As discussed in the following section, any assessment of
trademark’s relationship to consumer information law should con-
sider these regimes as well.
162. Grynberg, supra note 80, at 69, 94-95.
163. See, e.g., Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1178. Courts were not always so comfortable. See infra
note 275 and accompanying text.
164. See Toyota, 610 F.3d at 1178-79.
165. Specifically the effect of the ACPA and UDRP regimes. See infra Part II.C.3. To some
extent, too, this may reflect the inability of courts and other legal actors to stamp out the
practice of using trademarks in domain names, which may be a byproduct of limitations to
ACPA or international jurisdiction issues.
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C. Hidden Consumer Information Laws?
The government, the news media, and fellow consumers—either
individually or aggregated in websites like yelp.com—among others,
also produce consumer information. These third parties may fill
gaps left in the regulation of sellers by the various consumer infor-
mation regimes.
This means that many more laws directly affect the generation
and dissemination of consumer information than those specifically
directed to sellers. For example, as discussed above, certain kinds
of food information may be hard to come by.166 Claims concerning
production conditions and health benefits are quintessential
“credence” goods.167 “Search” attributes (for example, price) may be
verified before purchase, and “experience” attributes (for example,
taste) may be assessed after purchase.168 By contrast, consumers
may never know whether sellers’ credence claims were true.169 Take
animal welfare in food production. Many blanch at the practices of
“factory farms,” but those practices may afford a price advantage in
a market free of animal welfare information. Consumers who would
pay a premium for humane treatment cannot effectively evaluate
whether they have gotten what they paid for based on their
experience of the final product. Representations about animal
welfare are therefore obvious regulatory fodder.170
To the extent that small market actors are better able to employ
the practices consumers care about, accurate information about
them may be underprovided.171 Attempts to force disclosure,
assuming regulator interest or an effective rule that survives the
166. See supra Part I.B.4.c.
167. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 9-13 (1992)
(discussing types of goods).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Meat and Poultry Labeling Terms, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.fsis.
usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/food-safety-education/get-answers/food-safety-fact-sheets/food-
labeling/meat-and-poultry-labeling-terms (last updated Aug. 9, 2013) (listing official meaning
of “free range” and “free roaming” only by reference to poultry and stating that “[p]roducers
must demonstrate to the Agency that the poultry has been allowed access to the outside”). 
171. This is a contested point, as privately generated mechanisms may promote
information flow—for example, the role of an aggregating retailer like Whole Foods. 
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lobbying process, may fall prey to the process/product distinction,172
and competitor lawsuits face obstacles when not brought by market
leaders.173 Additionally, problems of scale and coordination may
frustrate attempts to resort to a trademark solution of creating a
certifying body to guarantee humane animal treatment.174
Third parties can help. Most of what we know about factory
farming comes from journalists and activists, not competitors.175 In
response, owners of food production facilities may seek legal
recourse by filing trade libel actions176 or lobbying for “ag-gag”
legislation that would increase the costs and risks of investigating
food production conditions by subjecting information-gathering
activities to civil or criminal liability.177
These extensions and innovations are arguably a hybrid form of
consumer information law, targeted as they are at specific commu-
nications. But the biggest obstacle to knowing what goes on at
factory farms is much more basic. The owners do not need spe-
cial legislation to keep reporters off their land; the law of trespass—
perhaps coupled with attention to employee screening—usually
does just fine.178
That may be a simple point, but it highlights a fundamental
difficulty with assessing consumer information laws. They may be
172. See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text. The free rider issues that prevent
coordinated litigation efforts in this regard might also be an obstacle to an effective
advertising campaign designed to raise awareness about food rearing practices.
174. See supra Part I.B.4.d.
175. See, e.g., Press Release, Animal Legal Defense Fund, Animal Legal Defense Fund
Files Historic “Ag Gag” Lawsuit (July 22, 2013), available at http://aldf.org/press-room/press-
releases/animal-legal-defense-fund-files-historic-ag-gag-lawsuit/.
176. See, e.g., Tex. Beef Grp. v. Winfrey, 201 F.3d 680 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). After
all, one person’s “pink slime” is another’s “lean[,] finely textured beef” and source of
livelihood. See Tiffany Hsu, Beef Worker Sues Diane Sawyer, Jamie Oliver Over “Pink Slime,”
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/12/business/la-fi-mo-bpi-pink-
slime-suit-20121212. 
177. See, e.g., Cody Carlson, The Ag Gag Laws: Hiding Factory Farm Abuses from Public
Scrutiny, THE ATLANTIC  (Mar. 12, 2012, 9:06 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/
archive/2012/03/the-ag-gag-laws-hiding-factory-farm-abuses-from-public-scrutiny/254674/. 
178. Cf. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1999). And
basic property rights do limit what we know. See, e.g., Sabrina Tavernise, Farm Use of
Antibiotics Defies Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/
health/use-of-antibiotics-in-animals-raised-for-food-defies-scrutiny.html?_r=1&pagewanted=
all (explaining that a lack of direct access to farms prevents regulators from checking on
compliance with existing rules).
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relatively unimportant, taking a back seat to other parts of the
larger system of consumer information generation and consump-
tions. Communities may have their own norms or institutions
whose regulatory role outweighs that played by formal legal
regimes.179 That laws and regulatory norms are often small parts of
larger, more complex systems is an insight well known in copyright
literature focusing on the generation of creative works.180 It applies
as well to consumer information, particularly that generated by
consumers.
This is especially clear with respect to the effect of Internet
intermediaries on consumer-generated information. Information
about the local hole in the wall that serves the best burgers is no
longer the province of a select few, but accessible to anyone with
Internet access and knowledge of yelp.com or any of a number of
food review sites. The roofer who left a flier on your door can be
checked out on Angie’s List. This information was always available,
but never in so convenient a form. Nothing in consumer information
law needed to change to bring this about.181
179. See generally, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (explaining how rural farmers apply informal norms rather than
formal legal rules to resolve disputes).
180. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 121-26 (2004). “The point is that some
of the ways in which we might protect authors will have unintended consequences for the
cultural environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment.” Id. at 129. A
number of works discuss the creation of expressive works notwithstanding the absence or
limitations of copyright regimes in the area. See, e.g., Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman,
There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the
Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787 (2008) (exploring how stand-up
comedians rely on social norms in the absence of applicable intellectual property solutions).
There are fewer studies of the role of norms and peer production in trademark subject
matter, but for one example, see David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Intellectual Property
Norms Governing Roller Derby Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093 (2012). 
181. To be sure, the aggregator model of consumer information may be vulnerable as
sellers learn how to game the Internet. See, e.g., Bing Liu, Opinion Spam Detection:
Detecting Fake Reviews and Reviewers, http://www.cs.uic.edu/~liub/FBS/fake-reviews.html
(last visited Mar. 16, 2014) (discussing the frequency and possible detection of opinion spam).
David Streitfeld, The Best Book Reviews Money Can Buy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/business/book-reviewers-for-hire-meet-a-demand-for-
online-raves.html?pagewanted=all. For a recent take that aggregator sites now tell us little:
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But the larger context remains in part a legal construct. The rise
of information aggregators on the Internet means that the laws
governing them are at least as important to the consumer informa-
tion problem as more traditional consumer information laws like
trademark or false advertising.182 In particular, § 230 of the
Communications Decency Act precludes treating providers of “inter-
active computer services” as speakers of third-party content.183 This
immunity has been essential to the Internet’s development as a
consumer information resource.184 The strength of websites like
yelp.com or Wikipedia is their openness to direct experience and
opinions, which creates the risk of hosting defamatory material.
Randall Munroe, Star Ratings, http://xkcd.com/1098 (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
Here, too, interactions between institutions matter. The FTC has attempted to regulate
misleading online endorsements. See 16 C.F.R. § 255 (2013); Press Release, FTC, FTC
Publishes Final Guides Governing Endorsements, Testimonials (Oct. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/10/endortest.shtm.
182. Which is not to say that information aggregators do not implicate trademark issues.
See generally Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and Its Implications for Trademark Law,
in TRADEMARK LAW & THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 404 (Graeme B.
Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008) (discussing trademark law’s effect on online word of
mouth exchange regarding brand information).
183. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
184. See generally Eric Goldman, The Regulation of Reputational Information, in THE
NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 293, 298-99 (Berin Szoka
& Adam Marcus eds., 2010) (noting problems in the production of reputational information
and postulating § 230 immunity as a key factor in the relative success of consumer review
websites).
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The CDA was not conceived with these sites in mind, but its
existence is crucial to theirs.185
The information made available by aggregator-driven websites
and the Internet more generally raises the question whether
consumer information law should change in response. In trademark
law, the issue manifests itself in the question of how sophisticated
we think consumers are and should be. As it becomes easier for a
rational consumer to become informed, do we think that it is
irrational to not do so? This question masks a distributional issue
in that neither Internet access nor sophistication is universal. The
developments driving these issues are largely external to trade-
mark law, but trademark doctrine must evolve to respond to them.
D. Upshots
This subpart draws some lessons from considering trademark
issues in light of the broader consumer information system.
185. See, e.g., Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250 (4th Cir.
2009) (applying CDA immunity to an aggregator of consumer-provided information); Global
Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929 (D. Ariz. 2008) (same).
Although IP laws, like trademark, are not within the CDA’s immunity ambit, 47 U.S.C. § 
230(e)(2), consumer reviews of products and services are usually safe nominative uses. As
discussed previously, see supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text, other mechanisms of
using trademarks to provide consumer information are more vulnerable to challenge.
The same can be said about the notice-and-takedown provisions of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006), whose principles have been applied in the
trademark realm. The Second Circuit’s approach to secondary trademark liability in Tiffany
(NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc. resembles the DMCA regime in that the court focused on eBay’s prompt
removal of infringing listings when notified by Tiffany. 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010).
Here, too, assessing the legal health of such sites may involve legal rules that may not
immediately come to mind. For example, some courts have applied anti-SLAPP (Strategic
Lawsuit Against Public Participation) legislation to disputes concerning online reviews. Eric
Goldman, CA Anti-SLAPP Cases Involving Consumer Reviews as Matters of Public Concern,
TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Feb. 3, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/02/ca_anti
slapp_ca.htm (surveying cases). See generally CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2011)
(“The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits
brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech
and petition for the redress of grievances.”).
Antitrust law and the FTC Act also loom large in the aggregator context, particularly
because of Google’s market dominance. See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, Google Agrees to
Change Its Business Practices to Resolve FTC Competition Concerns in the Markets for
Devices Like Smart Phones, Games and Tablets, and in Online Search (Jan. 3, 2013),
available at http://ftc.gov/opa/2013/01/google.shtm (announcing the closure of an FTC
investigation into Google for search engine bias).
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1. Consumer Information Law as a Complex System
The consumer information “ecosystem” is complex. Its many
players and regulatory regimes overlap and interact in a variety of
ways, some not immediately obvious. Evaluating any particular
doctrine or answering any question that implicates multiple bodies
of law is therefore complicated.
Some judicial ramifications are discussed below, but it is worth
considering the challenges for those looking to improve the
operation of consumer information law as a policy matter.186
Suppose a food advocacy organization wishes to stabilize the
meaning of the term “local.” Any effort requires looking to multiple
doctrines while considering the activities of multiple institutional
actors. For example, the term “local” raises issues of the line
between express and implied falsehoods. The claim that a food is
local encompasses a range of meanings—for example, it was grown
locally, it was packaged locally, local workers grew the food, the
inputs used were local, the proceeds of the sale will be directed to
or spent within the area, and so on. Additionally, the term may
encompass a geographic range, from within the county to within the
state to within the country. Some of these claims may be true;
others, false. A false advertising suit187 faces the difficulty of
determining which meanings are perceived by the intended
186. It also presents interesting questions about points of emphasis. Suppose a small-
farmer advocacy organization decides that the existence of review aggregator sites is more
important to informed consumers than any plausible direct consumer information
reform—for example, altering the USDA definition of “organic.” Does that mean its agenda
becomes synonymous with open Internet protection? Notably, the broad coalition opposing
the Stop Online Piracy Act and the Protect IP Act on the grounds of their threat to Internet
freedom included consumer advocacy organizations like USPIRG, the Consumer Federation
of America, and Consumers Union. See Letter from the Consumer Fed’n of Am. Consumers
Union and U.S. PIRG to Members of Congress (Nov. 15, 2011), available at https://www.cdt.
org/files/file/consumer%20letter%20on%20SOPA%20final-1.pdf (“Consumers benefit greatly
from being able to use the Internet to connect with a wide variety of buyers, sellers, and with
each other. Online forums and marketplaces allow consumers to exchange information about
products and exchange products themselves in thriving secondary markets. However, the
broad language of the bill threatens these activities.”).
187. Or private recourse to the National Advertising Division (NAD). See NAD Challenges,
Complaints, ADVERT. INDUS. SELF-REGULATORY COUNCIL, http://www.asrcreviews.org/
category/nad/challenges-and-complaints (last visited Feb. 26, 2013) (providing information
to help consumers and businesses file complaints).
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audience, but that analysis assumes that the use of local may
encompass a range of meanings.
Our advocacy group moves up the line and attempts to secure an
official definition of local. Here, it will have to account for a
government regulator. Now the goal is to fix meaning broadly,
rather than to deem a particular message as being within or
without a range of permissible meanings. The desired official, fixed
definition may become a double-edged sword, potentially excluding
members of the enacting coalition. Where once a range of meanings
could satisfy a sense of what it means to be local,188 the term’s
meaning will likely become more circumscribed, presenting issues
of under- and overinclusion and a differing calibration of the
rules/standards divide (not to mention the risk that once the battle
at the regulatory level begins, interests with a contrary definition
of local might prevail). That change will, in turn, filter back down
to other consumer information regimes, as consumers who attach
one meaning to the term as part of everyday language may adopt
another in response to an official interpretation.
Or we can move down the line to the trademark solution, forming
a certifying body to promote a specific vision of the meaning of local.
These efforts would face the collective action problem of establish-
ing a certifying entity with (1) the requisite independence from the
sellers it would benefit, and (2) the resources to produce a signal
strong enough to be heard above the noise generated by those
promoting differing definitions. Because not all competing labels
are legitimate,189 the amount of competing noise would also depend
on other regimes and actors. That is, does the FTC crack down on
loose certification practices? Does state law allow a remedy when
consumers are deceived by lax certifiers?190
Though not intractable, these issues underscore the fact that the
complexity of the task reaches beyond choosing the optimal
188. For example, not grown locally but processed locally by a local company; grown locally
but processed elsewhere; grown and processed elsewhere but by a local company using local
inputs; or grown and processed locally by a nonlocal multinational.
189. See supra note 145.
190. See, e.g., In re Aurora Dairy Corp. Organic Milk Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 621
F.3d 781 (8th Cir. 2010) (dismissing a state law claim against a certifier of organic status in
light of its participation in federal organic program).
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definition of local. They also create challenges for administering
trademark law.
2. How Should Trademark Cases Be Decided?
The Lanham Act’s text is open-ended in many respects, inviting
some judicial creativity,191 and much of trademark law has been
made in the common law style. The question of how much that
method should persist and guide future trademark developments
is contestable both normatively and descriptively.192
The debate over whether case-by-case adjudication or broad
legislation produces optimal policy is familiar. Advocates of the
common law approach argue that its narrow focus on particular
parties and their specific issues allows the law to develop in a
careful, incremental manner.193 Skeptics view the primacy of the
particular as a weakness. The artificial narrowing performed by the
legal process may leave courts unable to appreciate the full
ramifications of their decisions. A legislature has the ability, at
least in theory, to take a more holistic approach to issues and
consider all relevant actors and arguments.194
In the trademark realm, this latter dynamic may be exacerbated
by the ability of repeat plaintiff players to choose unsympathetic tar-
gets. By picking defendants that judges are likely to paint as bad
faith actors,195 plaintiffs are able to shape the law to their advantage
191. See infra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
192. Compare Grynberg, supra note 72, at 901-02, with Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing
Defenses in Trademark Law, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 137 (2009) (“[T]he basic theory
of the Lanham Act allows greater common law development of defenses by courts.”).
193. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L.
REV. 1, 1 (1870) (“It is the merit of the common law that it decides the case first and
determines the principle afterwards.”).
194. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 894 (2006)
(“But if the immediate case is not representative, it may still be mistakenly thought to be
representative, a mistake generated precisely by the fact that this case is before the
decisionmaker while other cases within the class are not.”).
195. Most multifactor tests consider whether the defendant is acting in bad faith, but this
factor is malleable in practice. It is easy for judges to fudge the difference between an intent
to confuse consumers and an intent to make use of a plaintiff ’s mark or benefit from its
goodwill. The latter does not necessarily harm consumers, but it may nonetheless be treated
as a species of bad faith. See Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d
1062, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006). The problem is important, for the bad faith factor has been found
to play an outsized role in trademark adjudication. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the
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in a manner detrimental to future defendants with more plausible
claims of acting in the overall public interest.196
A common law approach to trademark is also open to the critique
that trademark’s policy issues are too complex for optimal resolu-
tion by judges as opposed to legislators.197 This is both a function of
courts’ relative ability to obtain information but also a byproduct of
their being able to deal only with the parties before them. Trade-
mark litigation compounds the problem by having a difficult
fundamental inquiry. Attempts to prove that consumers are likely
to be confused generally proceed in the absence of any actually
confused consumers. The fact-finder faces the difficult task of
projecting what a consumer would likely experience (after defining
that consumer) and filtering that analysis through the sometimes
competing (and contested) interests served by trademark law. And
the court must do so with due regard to buyers, sellers, and
competitors not before it. 
The overlapping regimes governing the generation and consump-
tion of consumer information suggest that legal complex-
ity—knowing what is going on in other regimes—is another
problem to add to the mix. The interplay of multiple doctrines may
not be fully appreciated insofar as the parties may not know to call
the issue to the court’s attention. This threatens the promise of
Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1628 (2006) (“[The
data] suggest that a finding of bad faith intent creates, if not in doctrine, then at least in
practice, a nearly un-rebuttable presumption of a likelihood of confusion.”).
196. Google’s status as a repeat (and deep-pocketed) defendant may ameliorate this effect.
197. Cf. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 262-63 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting):
The unwritten law possesses capacity for growth; and has often satisfied new
demands for justice by invoking analogies or by expanding a rule or principle.
This process has been in the main wisely applied and should not be
discontinued. Where the problem is relatively simple, as it is apt to be when
private interests only are involved, it generally proves adequate. But with the
increasing complexity of society, the public interest tends to become
omnipresent; and the problems presented by new demands for justice cease to
be simple. Then the creation or recognition by courts of a new private right may
work serious injury to the general public, unless the boundaries of the right are
definitely established and wisely guarded. In order to reconcile the new private
right with the public interest, it may be necessary to prescribe limitations and
rules for its enjoyment; and also to provide administrative machinery for
enforcing the rules. It is largely for this reason that, in the effort to meet the
many new demands for justice incident to a rapidly changing civilization, resort
to legislation has latterly been had with increasing frequency.
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case-by-case adjudication, the notion that we might have narrow
rulings precisely calibrated to particular facts.
In my view, the complexity of the interaction between trademark
and other consumer information laws suggests caution regarding
common law making in trademark law. Creating policy is hard
enough without delving into other, intertwined doctrines. But this
skepticism exists to the extent that trademark law cannot be
simplified. If trademark law shortens its reach, the benefits
purportedly offered by common law making will be easier to realize.
Trimming the overlap between trademark and other consumer
information regimes may simplify its policy questions. As described
in the next Part, one way to do this is for trademark law to look for
ways to offload issues that are, or may be better, dealt with
elsewhere.
II. OFFLOADING
As discussed above, trademark law is not what it used to be. For
good or ill, it reaches far beyond its traditional role of preventing
the passing off of goods. But trademark is not the only game in
town; other consumer information regimes address many of the
policy concerns driving trademark’s expansion. This Part argues
that trademark law would often benefit by “offloading” some of its
acquired baggage elsewhere.
Offloading is not a new concept in trademark litigation. Courts
have often pruned trademark’s overgrowth to limit conflict with
other IP laws.198 The famous examples concern overlaps with patent
and copyright. For example, judges have gotten over their reticence
with extending trademark protection to nonword marks. Colors,
product packaging, and, to a lesser extent, product designs are
198. The boundary issue with other IP regimes is raised not only by federal law, but by
state efforts to control perceived forms of unfair competition and misappropriation. See, e.g.,
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 144 (1989) (invalidating a state
statute protecting unpatented boat hulls); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S.
234, 237 (1964) (“[W]hen an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law may
not forbid others to copy that article. To forbid copying would interfere with the federal
policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes,
of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the
public domain.”); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1964) (rejecting
the use of state unfair competition law to prevent copying of unpatented product design).
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eligible for trademark status.199 It is a small step from protecting
such designs as source-identifying trademarks to using trademark
law to stifle competition in product markets. A useful design that
might be protected by a time-limited patent might instead become
an immortal trademark.200 This would threaten the policies of
patent law, which is the designated federal venue for the protection
of inventions qua inventions.201
Several rules therefore patrol the boundary between trademark
and patent law. Most notably, the functionality doctrine denies
trademark protection to utilitarian subject matter.202 Courts and
199. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765, 767 (1992). Although
product design may be trademarked, it must not be functional and the design must have
secondary meaning, which is to say that consumers must see the design as performing a
source-identifying function. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 214
(2000).
For earlier views on trade dress protection, see, for example, Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 776
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (contending that the original Lanham Act did not
permit a cause of action for infringement of unregistered trade dress, and that judicial
interpretation had outpaced statutory text, but nonetheless noting, “I agree with this
transformation, even though it marks a departure from the original text, because it is
consistent with the purposes of the statute and has recently been endorsed by Congress”);
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 8:1 (explaining that trade dress was once protected not by
trademark law, but “[a]s with archaic ‘trade names,’ trade dress protected under the law of
‘unfair competition’ always required proof of secondary meaning”); 1 WILLIAM D. SHOEMAKER,
TRADE-MARKS: A TREATISE ON THE SUBJECT OF TRADE-MARKS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE
TO THE LAWS RELATING TO REGISTRATION THEREOF 236 (1931) (“Physical characteristics of
an article, its appearance, style or dress-up or features of containers or wrappers cannot be
subject of exclusive appropriation.”). 
200. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2000) (“Trade dress
protection must subsist with the recognition that in many instances there is no prohibition
against copying goods and products. In general, unless an intellectual property right such
as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copying. As the Court has
explained, copying is not always discouraged or disfavored by the laws which preserve our
competitive economy.”). Although characterizations of what trademark is “about” are
contested, the competition-promoting goal is well-pedigreed. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (1946),
as reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275 (“Trade-marks, indeed, are the essence of
competition, because they make possible a choice between competing articles by enabling the
buyer to distinguish one from the other.”).
201. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 34 (“The Lanham Act does not exist to reward
manufacturers for their innovation in creating a particular device; that is the purpose of the
patent law and its period of exclusivity.”). To be sure, this concern could also be characterized
as endogenous to trademark law—that is that trademark law should promote, rather than
stifle, competition.
202. See id. at 32-33 (describing tests for functionality). The requirement, noted above,
that product design have secondary meaning before trademark protection is possible also
limits tensions with patent law. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 214.
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commentators, in turn, consider the doctrine with an eye to patent
law, which is the normal venue for the protection of inventive
design.203
The conflicts reach beyond patent law. Cases concerning aesthetic
functionality implicate copyright and design patent policy.204
Trademark may be claimed over expressive content, raising copy-
right policy issues.205 State IP regimes create similar problems.206
Courts pay less attention to the role of other consumer informa-
tion regimes in considering trademark’s proper scope. This Part
argues that these laws offer an underdeveloped basis for limiting
trademark law’s reach. The policies driving claims at trademark’s
periphery would often be better off offloaded to and addressed by
one of these alternative regimes.
A. Trademark’s Expansion and Its Challenge for Reformers
The argument developed here is proffered as a mechanism for
simplifying trademark’s administration as part of a larger system
of consumer information law. It is also an approach to reforming
some of trademark’s excesses. The rationales may be independ-
ent—that is, one may be concerned with simplifying consumer
information law but not with trademark overreach and vice versa—
but it is worth situating the second perspective before proceeding.
Critiques of trademark’s expansion have a problem. Congress
rewrote the Lanham Act in part to keep up with expansive judicial
interpretations of its original terms.207 The resulting open-ended
203. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 30 (“Where the expired patent claimed the features
in question, one who seeks to establish trade dress protection must carry the heavy burden
of showing that the feature is not functional, for instance by showing that it is merely an
ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device.”); see, e.g., Davis, supra note 1, at
233-34.
204. Eco Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 357 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting
rationales for treating a circular thermostat as functional without regard to consumer views
of aesthetics); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 7:80 (noting skepticism of aesthetic functionality
in circuits).
205. See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003). 
206. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006) (Copyright Act’s preemption clause); cases cited supra
note 198. States do have the ability to create parallel trademark regimes. See, e.g., MD. CODE
ANN. BUS. REG. § 1-414 (West 2013); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.102 (West 2013).
207. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 40 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577,
5603 (“[The bill] revises Section 43(a) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 1125(a)) to codify the
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text leaves room for courts to expand the trademark cause of action
further still. Key words like “likelihood,” “confusion,” and “ap-
proval” are undefined, opening the door to judicial creativity and
applications of the trademark cause of action to situations alien to
its common law roots.208 Reformers have suggested a variety of
ways to control trademark’s scope despite the Lanham Act’s open
text. The approaches overlap, and many (myself included) promote
multiple arguments.
One approach is to embrace the common law method and focus
on policy. Judges would reject harmful expansions of trademark
law, but their method would track the judicial approach that
expanded trademark law. Reformers suggest a variety of policy
metrics as guides, including minimizing search costs or otherwise
improving market efficiency,209 promoting consumer autonomy,210
protecting free expression,211 enhancing overall consumer welfare,212
and paying closer attention to empirical research.213
Other arguments are less directly focused on trademark policy.
Some focus on the litigation process, looking for ways for courts to
minimize enforcement costs and otherwise promote the efficient
disposition of claims.214 Another nonpolicy approach is legalistic in
interpretation it has been given by the courts.”); cf. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763, 776 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I think it is important to
recognize that the meaning of the text [of section 43(a)] has been transformed by the federal
courts over the past few decades. I agree with this transformation, even though it marks a
departure from the original text, because it is consistent with the purposes of the statute and
has recently been endorsed by Congress.”).
208. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006) (providing for liability for conduct that “is likely to
cause confusion ... as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person”). This is in marked contrast to the statute’s limited
provisions for trademark defenses. See generally Grynberg, supra note 72, at 967-69 (arguing
that courts are unlikely to be able to devise reliably effective trademark defenses).
209. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search
Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 778 (2004).
210. See, e.g., Laura A. Heymann, The Public’s Domain in Trademark Law: A First
Amendment Theory of the Consumer, 43 GA. L. REV. 651, 656 (2009).
211. See, e.g., Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70
TENN. L. REV. 1095, 1146 (2003).
212. See, e.g., Grynberg, supra note 80, at 78.
213. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive
Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 568 (2008) (questioning data proffered to support trademark’s
expansion). 
214. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV.
2099 (2004).
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orientation, making a textual case that the Lanham Act is more
limited than it appears, particularly when interpreted with an eye
to the larger legal context in which trademark law operates.215
Looking to the broader legal context introduces another set of
limiting arguments based on the role of judges in construing
trademark law. In an earlier article, I argued that judges should
interpret trademark law with an eye to promoting its coherence as
a body of rules that is accessible and transparent to those regulated
or protected by it while remaining sensitive to the accountability
concerns of taking the law in directions unforeseen by Congress in
enacting the Lanham Act.216
Trademark’s history is another potential source of limits. The
traditional scope of trademark law could provide a basis for
demanding that Congress be explicit about undermining common
law understandings.217 Examining history may also buttress policy
arguments that trademark is really “about” something other than
its most expansive modern claims.218 Or it may uncover checks to
the cause of action that deserve to be revived or restored to
prominence.219
B. Why and When to Offload
Thinking about trademark’s place among consumer information
laws offers another argument for trademark reform that is not
directly about policy. If another consumer information regime does
the work of an expanded trademark claim, courts should look for
ways to channel that claim out of trademark law.220
215. Grynberg, supra note 72, at 963-65.
216. Michael Grynberg, The Judicial Role in Trademark Law, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1283 (2011).
217. See, e.g., Wilhelm Pudenz, GmbH v. Littlefuse, Inc., 177 F.3d 1204, 1210-12 (11th Cir.
1999) (preserving common law defense to infringement despite then-statute’s failure to
mention it).
218. Alternatively it might suggest a tension between appeals to history and what that
history really shows. Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1843 (2007) (“The real shift in modern trademark law then was
not one from consumer focus to producer focus, or from consumer protection to property.
Instead, modern trademark law differs fundamentally from its traditional counterpart in its
understanding of what a trademark does and how it adds value.”).
219. See, e.g., Stacey Dogan & Mark Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through
Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1675-82 (2007).
220. This claim has strong and weak variants. The strong approach is to say that the claim
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Multiple causes of action might capture a claimed harm, but
some are better fits than others. A type of claim that is at the core
of one body of law may be peripheral to another. This creates the
risk that adjudication under the peripheral regime might upset
well-established policy tradeoffs elsewhere. The “core” body of law
will have evolved various doctrines and sub-doctrines to mediate
the policy tradeoffs implicated by the claim. In contrast, the
peripheral regime will be less able to rely on accumulated prece-
dents or legislative fine-tuning to capture the particularized
nuances of the case at hand.221
This dynamic is well understood when other IP regimes are at
issue. Copyrights cannot be used to claim rights over ideas and
methods of operation in part because a copyright claim would not
have to clear the hurdle of administrative review demanded by
patent law.222 Trademarks cannot be used to establish property
rights over utilitarian design or expression qua expression in part
should be precluded altogether. The existence of regimes that are a better fit supports the
argument that federal unfair competition law should avoid “cumulation” of claims and treat
the existence of a tailored regime as implicitly excluding the use of another for the same
task.
The weaker claim is simply that courts should consider questions of fit and channeling in
determining whether to recognize a tenuous trademark claim when its subject matter is
better covered by another regime. Alternatively, courts should interpret the scope of the
trademark claim, when such interpretation is possible, to be consistent with the policies
embodied by the disposition of the alternative claim. This would mean construing the claim
such that its trademark form would not reach beyond its parallel outside trademark law.
Which approach to follow depends largely on context (for example, the openness of the
Lanham Act provision in question), as some broad trademark claims are easier than others
to categorically exclude from the Lanham Act’s provisions. Given that the law generally does
not proscribe overlapping claims arising from the same transaction, the latter formulation
will generally be the applicable one. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of
Ontology: A Teleological Approach to Trademark Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 611, 625-32 (1999)
(discussing cumulative claims in intellectual property law).
221. Judges are sensitive to this danger in other contexts. For example, several precedents
avoid construing general litigation-authorizing statutes as applying to statutory schemes
with defined remedial policies. See, e.g., Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 352-53
(1984) (precluding review under the Administrative Procedure Act of milk market orders by
end consumers in light of an administrative regime designed to oversee program); Middlesex
Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981) (“When the
remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may
suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.”).
222. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879).
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because trademark rights are not time limited as are their patent
and copyright counterparts.223
The same problem exists among consumer information laws, but
courts are less attuned to it. For example, false endorsement by a
celebrity could plausibly be described as a problem of publicity law
(a state claim),224 false advertising,225 or (less plausibly) trade-
mark.226 To the extent it “belongs” in false advertising, that doctrine
will have tools to prevent overreaching claims. If courts let plain-
tiffs evade these strictures by allowing the claim in trademark,
things may get out of hand. Trademark may not have evolved rules
to control the endorsement cause of action. Alternatively, courts
might fail to adapt traditional trademark defenses to the expanded
cause of action.227 In either case, the expanded cause of action could
proliferate like an invasive species free of the predators that would
normally keep its numbers down.228 Even if courts push back, there
223. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2003)
(warning against construing trademark law to limit public access to works for which
copyright has expired); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001)
(“The Lanham Act does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating
a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity.”).
224. See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1075/10 (2013) (“The right to control and to choose
whether and how to use an individual’s identity for commercial purposes is recognized as
each individual’s right of publicity.”).
225. Assuming prudential standing hurdles can be cleared. See supra notes 133-34 and
accompanying text.
226. I say less plausibly because the statement “Celebrity X uses Y” moves us further from
trademark’s traditional core in which a mark X designates a source of Y. Here, X is used to
describe an attribute of Y. X is not a traditional mark, and it is not performing the traditional
mark function. Given § 43(a)’s reference to “sponsorship” and “approval” and judicial
interpretations thereof, such a claim may now be a part of trademark law, but it is an
example of what I mean by a peripheral, non-core claim. In contrast, we are much closer to
the respective cores of false advertising and publicity doctrine. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 
3344 (West 2013) (providing liability for the knowing use of “another’s name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods,
or for purposes of advertising or selling ... without such person’s prior consent”).
227. See Grynberg, supra note 72, at 916-17 (discussing failure of trademark’s expansion
in the false endorsement context to bring along potentially relevant limiting doctrines like
abandonment). 
228. Professor Tushnet’s description of the treatment of false endorsement claims in the
Third Circuit illustrates this point. Because false advertising law requires plaintiffs to show
that consumers perceive a misleading message in cases in which there is no explicit message
of endorsement, plaintiffs were drawn to trying to shoehorn the claims into trademark law.
See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 1330. Trademark, lacking a similar requirement, had no
similar check. This smoothed the way for a trademarked-based claim that the use of deceased
John Facenda’s voice (known from NFL films) in a television show about the making of an
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will be uncertainty. A cause of action with an undefined scope and
undefined defenses leaves attorneys unable to give clear answers to
simple questions. An overreaching claim is likely to have a greater
in terrorem effect if one cannot precisely articulate why it might
fail.229
Maintaining good fences between doctrinal neighbors thus
promotes multiple values. It improves transparency, enabling
regulated entities to know better what is demanded of them and
conform their conduct accordingly.230 Offloading peripheral claims
also promotes the related goal of coherence, making doctrine more
readily comprehendible as a set of interrelated and consistent
commands.231 Last, offloading enhances political accountability.232
Reintroducing a policy issue that is settled in a “core” body of law
into a peripheral doctrine risks destabilizing settled understand-
ings. Judges should not do so lightly, especially if those understand-
ings are the product of political settlements.233
NFL-themed video game somehow constituted false endorsement. Id. at 1330, 1355-56
(discussing Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008)). Because the claim
fell under § 43(a)(1)(A), not the false advertising provision of (a)(1)(B), the Third Circuit
concluded that the plaintiff did not have to show that consumers perceived an endorsement
message or that the message was material. Id.
229. See supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text (listing devices used by courts to avoid
finding liability in a trademark case).
230. See Grynberg, supra note 216, at 1295-96.
231. See id. at 1296.
232. See id. at 1294.
233. See, e.g., id. at 1294-95. Here, too, judges are aware of the danger in other doctrines.
For example, § 230 of the Communications Decency Act precludes treating users and
providers of interactive computer services as speakers or publishers of third-party content.
47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). The immediate impact of § 230 was to rule out claims against
Internet intermediaries that sounded in defamation, even if plaintiffs tried to style them in
a manner to avoid that characterization. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
328 (4th Cir. 1997). This led plaintiffs to resort to peripheral doctrines in an effort to
recharacterize their claims. Whatever can be said about the merits of the resulting claims,
they place pressure on the immunity created by Congress. Courts are therefore sensitive to
the risk that artful pleading will upset Congress’s policy choice. See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!,
Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A] plaintiff cannot sue someone for publishing
third-party content simply by changing the name of the theory from defamation to
negligence. Nor can he or she escape section 230(c) by labeling as a ‘negligent undertaking’
an action that is quintessentially that of a publisher.”).
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C. Reclassifying Harms
Plaintiff appeals to read the Lanham Act expansively often find
willing ears in that judges see something in need of polic-
ing—nevermind whether the claim is part of trademark law’s
traditional subject matter. Pushing back is easier if there is another
regime to which the judge who feels that “something must be done”
may be directed. So, for example, judges sometimes fall prey to
appeals to treat trademark law as an incentive regime.234 But not
always. One reason is that parallel IP regimes of copyright and
patent are the traditional avenues for incentivizing creative and
inventive production.235
Sometimes the appeal to judicial conscience concerns false
information about a product, even though said information is not (or
is only debatably) relevant to trademark law. Trademark’s strug-
gles with nominative uses are a good example, and they illustrate
how offloading has insulated trademark in the past and might do
so in the future.
1. Nominative Use Then
A nominative use refers to the trademark holder or her product.
It does not directly misbrand goods.236 This is not to say that
nominative uses cannot harm consumers. A drug maker’s false
claim to be selling the chemical equivalent of, say, TYLENOL is a
problem, but not one of trademark law. Such a reference might
“misrepresent[ ] the nature, characteristics, [or] qualities” of the
product, but that is the traditional province of false advertising
law.237 Or, in the case of falsely labeled generic acetaminophen, the
Food and Drug Administration would also be expected to
intervene.238
234. See, e.g., Bos. Prof ’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d
1004, 1011 (5th Cir. 1975) (allowing a merchandising claim in part because “the major
commercial value of the emblems is derived from the efforts of plaintiffs”).
235. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2000). 
236. To be sure, one could effectively counterfeit a mark and surround it with hard-to-see
text that says “We’re not TRADEMARK,” but that is a nominative use in name only, which
traditional trademark analysis would be able to accommodate.
237. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
238. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
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In the past, trademark law directed claims revolving around
nominative uses to such alternative venues.239 The textbook staple
Smith v. Chanel, Inc. is a classic example.240 The case is remem-
bered for the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to let trademark law stop
Chanel’s competitor from advertising that its perfume smelled like
Chanel.241 “To prohibit use of a competitor’s trademark for the sole
purpose of identifying the competitor’s product would bar effective
communication of claims of equivalence.”242
Less well remembered is that Chanel ultimately prevailed. The
Ninth Circuit’s blessing of comparative advertising contained a
caveat. Although it was in the public interest to allow the seller of
“Second Chance” to tell consumers that it offered an indistinguish-
able product for one third the price, this “[a]ssum[ed] the equiva-
lence of ‘Second Chance’ and ‘Chanel No. 5.’”243 Absent such
equivalence, Chanel could proceed under false advertising law,
which has tools for evaluating the range of meanings that could be
encompassed by a claim of equivalence or the distinction between
a false statement and a literally true, but nonetheless misleading,
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585; FDA Ensures Equivalence of Generic Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Aug. 2002), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/EmergencyPreparedness/BioterrorismandDrugPre
paredness/ucm134444.htm (describing how the FDA ensures equivalence between generic
and brand name drugs); supra note 75 and accompanying text.
239. Tushnet, supra note 7, at 1363.
240. 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968).
241. The ad in question read in part, “We dare you to try to detect any difference between
Chanel #5 (25.00) and Ta’Ron’s 2nd Chance. $7.00.” Id. at 563.
242. Id. at 567-68.
243. Id. at 568.
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claim.244 Here, at the end of the day, the defendant’s advertisement
was deemed false and enjoined.245
2. Nominative Use Now
Smith never suggests that comparative advertising is a trade-
mark harm,246 drawing on a long tradition of excluding such
referential uses from trademark liability.247 Today trademark law
is less sure of itself when it comes to categorical exclusions of
nominative uses as the basis of liability.
Courts handle nominative use in a variety of ways. Some apply
a distinct framework to evaluate whether the use in question
qualifies as a “nominative fair use.”248 In the Ninth Circuit, the test
is “whether (1) the product was readily identifiable without use of
the mark; (2) defendant used more of the mark than necessary; or
(3) defendant falsely suggested he was sponsored or endorsed by the
trademark holder.”249 The last question is the fighting ground of
many cases and has been criticized for reintroducing the traditional
likelihood-of-confusion inquiry by another name.250
244. False advertising law distinguishes between explicit and implied falsehoods while
making a distinction between actionable representations and mere “puffing.” See, e.g., Time
Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining the
distinction between literally false and not literally false, but misleading, advertisements); id.
at 158 (adopting the “false by necessary implication” doctrine); Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John’s
Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 504 (5th Cir. 2000) (concluding that “Better Ingredients, Better
Pizza” slogan was nonactionable puffery). See generally TUSHNET & GOLDMAN, supra note 44,
at 160-244 (describing the interplay between various doctrines). This mix of doctrines has
been criticized for being insufficiently tough on false advertising defendants by requiring
plaintiffs to bear the expense of consumer-reaction surveys in situations in which judges
ought to be able to assess the misleading nature of an advertisement. See Tushnet, supra
note 7, at 1337-44. But the question whether false advertisement doctrines are optimally
calibrated is independent of the claim that they address the question of how to interpret a
representation.
245. Chanel, Inc. v. Smith, 528 F.2d 284, 285 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
246. The opinion allows the possibility of a claim not only if the defendant misrepresents
its product, but also if it “create[s] a reasonable likelihood that purchasers will be confused
as to the source, identity, or sponsorship of the advertiser’s product.” Smith, 402 F.2d at 563.
This is the traditional trademark harm, of course, and the court did not try to fit the
defendant’s nominative use into it. See id.
247. Id. at 563-64.
248. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir.
2010).
249. Id. at 1175-76 (internal quotation marks omitted).
250. See, e.g., William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49,
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Other courts shoehorn nominative use situations into the
multifactor likelihood-of-confusion test normally applied to
trademark infringement claims.251 The problem here is that the test
was developed to evaluate potential confusion between similar but
nevertheless distinct marks.252 It is ill-suited for comparing a mark
to itself.253
In many cases, a better answer would be to recall that nomina-
tive use may cause harm without being a trademark harm.
Litigation over keyword advertising is one example.254 These claims
have always been an uneasy fit for trademark law, especially when
directed against search engine intermediaries. Keyword advertising
cannot be evaluated in isolation from the speech it enables. Using
a trademarked term to return a sponsored link has no meaning
independent of what is returned except in the most general way.
Some returned links might be designed to deceive consumers. For
example, a website may promise Tiffany products, but actually
traffic in counterfeits. Others might offer authentic, albeit second-
hand, goods.255 Others might be using keywords to communicate
category similarity—that the returned link offers a product or
service in the same category as that of the mark holder.256 Each use
carries a different meaning and raises distinct policy implications.
That meaning cannot be ascertained merely by reference to the
practice of purchasing trademarks as keywords. We need to look at
91 (2008).
251. See, e.g., Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 155 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he
district court did not commit reversible error in failing to address every factor. In the future,
however, a district court opting not to address a given factor or group of factors should
provide at least a brief explanation of its reasons.”).
252. In a traditional trademark infringement case, however much of the senior user’s
mark the defendant uses, the defendant is still identifying a distinct source of goods. This is
quite different than the referential purpose of the nominative use situation. 
253. See, e.g., Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 232 (3d Cir.
2005) (Fisher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing the court’s modified
multifactor test “is so watered-down that plaintiffs might prove likely confusion on one Lapp
factor alone”).
254. For an overview of keyword advertising, see supra Part I.B.1.
255. As permitted by trademark’s first-sale or exhaustion doctrine. See, e.g., Brilliance
Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Communications, Inc., 474 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Under
the exception, resale by the first purchaser of the original trademarked item is generally
neither trademark infringement nor unfair competition.”); see also Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty,
264 U.S. 359, 369 (1924). 
256. See Grynberg, supra note 80, at 86.
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what the returned links and surrounding advertising actually
say.257 The interpretive task will often be one of evaluating repre-
sentations about the mark holder—in other words, a nominative
use situation.258 That analysis will generally be accomplished best
under the false advertising framework.
The Second Circuit took steps in this direction in Tiffany (NJ)
Inc. v. eBay, Inc.259 eBay used the TIFFANY mark in advertising
and sponsored links to advertise the availability of branded jewelry
on eBay.260 Because some eBay sellers actually offered counterfeits,
Tiffany sued, claiming direct and contributory infringement,
dilution, and false advertising. eBay prevailed after a bench trial,
and the Second Circuit upheld its trademark win.261
The court held that eBay could not be on the hook for direct
trademark infringement because it “used the mark to describe
accurately the genuine Tiffany goods offered for sale on its website”
without suggesting that the companies were affiliated.262 In other
words, eBay made a lawful nominative use.263 Tiffany’s complained-
257. Judge Waddoups recognized this point in recent keyword litigation:
Because a consumer cannot see a keyword, nor tell what keyword generated an
advertisement, the court concludes that the mere purchase of a trademark as
a keyword cannot alone result in consumer confusion. Accordingly, the relevant
inquiry here regarding consumer confusion is not just what keyword was
purchased, but what was the language of the advertisement generated by that
keyword.
1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1174 (D. Utah 2010); see also
TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc., 653 F.3d 820, 827 (9th Cir. 2011) (observing that
although “there’s nothing inherently misleading about sponsored search results, they can
mislead if they are named so as to give a false impression as to the likely sponsorship of the
website to which they refer” and analyzing a false advertising claim by looking to the content
of the linked cite itself). Litigation concerning the alternate enforcement avenue of FTC
action has made the same point. FTC v. Cantkier, 767 F. Supp. 2d 147, 156 n.11 (D.D.C.
2011) (“[T]he allegation of bidding on particular keywords per se would not be a deceptive act
or practice.... The gravamen of [the FTC’s claim] is that the advertisements purchased in
connection with the keywords contained deceptive titles and hyperlinks that were likely to
mislead consumers.”).
258. Insofar as there may be trademark infringement on the linked page (to whatever
extent it, too, is not better covered by false advertising law), we are beyond the practice of
keyword advertising that prompted the user to click on the link in the first instance.
259. 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
260. Id. at 101.
261. Id. at 96.
262. Id. at 103.
263. The court did not get into the need for a precise analysis akin to the nominative fair
use doctrines, concluding that circuit precedent simply recognized that such uses are legal
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of harm, that eBay was abetting counterfeit sellers and that eBay’s
ads misled consumers, needed to be addressed elsewhere, in this
case by the contributory infringement and false advertising
doctrines, respectively.264 Doing so allowed direct confrontation with
questions of eBay’s intent, in the case of contributory
infringement,265 or advertising meaning, in the case of the false
advertising claim.266
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit allowed a similar claim against
Google to proceed in an opinion that underscores the conceptual
weakness of using trademark law to evaluate keyword advertising.
Rosetta Stone sued Google for keyword advertising based on its
mark because some keyword purchasers sold counterfeit Rosetta
Stone products.267 The litigation was therefore partly about Google’s
potential liability for contributory infringement, but the court also
ruled that a claim for direct infringement could proceed against
Google.268
without more. Id. at 102-03. This “without more” is the fighting ground in cases that have
recognized nominative fair use as an official doctrine. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 7, at
1315-16 (asserting that arguments that nominative uses are simply nonconfusing are
incomplete because they ignore the role of implicature). It is therefore perhaps more accurate
to describe the court’s interpretation of existing precedent as simply presuming the legality
of nominative use.
264. Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d at 103 (“eBay’s knowledge vel non that counterfeit Tiffany
wares were offered through its website is relevant to the issue of whether eBay contributed
to the direct infringement of Tiffany’s mark by the counterfeiting vendors themselves, or
whether eBay bears liability for false advertising.”).
265. Offloading the issue to contributory infringement is important because direct
trademark infringement lacks an intent requirement, exacerbating the risk that the
litigation could be used to “unduly inhibit the lawful resale of genuine Tiffany goods.” Id.
266. The court remanded for consideration of the false advertising claim because the
district court, in its view, conflated the legality of nominative use with the position that the
advertising was not misleading (in that consumers might be led to believe that eBay did not
host counterfeit goods). Id. at 114. On remand, the district court had little trouble ruling in
eBay’s favor on the false advertising claim. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., No. 04 Civ.
4607(RJS), 2010 WL 3733894 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2010). Professor Tushnet criticizes the
circuit court’s remand for needlessly adding litigation costs. Tushnet, supra note 7, at 1363
n.238. Leaving aside whether it should have been obvious to the circuit that no remand was
necessary on eBay’s facts, the court’s point—that whether eBay misled consumers with its
advertising is inherently a question of false advertising, not trademark law—is correct unless
one takes the view that the doctrines should be less autonomous. See id. at 1313. On this
point, see infra Part II.F.3. 
267. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152 (4th Cir. 2012).
268. Id. at 173. The case ultimately settled. Joe Mullin, Google Settles Rosetta Stone
Lawsuit, Its Last Major Dispute Over AdWords, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 1, 2012 1:35 PM),
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As with eBay, the mark was put to largely nominative uses.269
Much of the multifactor test, therefore, had nothing to do with
whether Google caused any confusion among consumers, but the
remaining factors say little about the advertising returned by the
keyword purchase.
The district court appreciated this distinction, noting that
Rosetta Stone’s evidence of actual confusion concerned consumers
who knew Rosetta Stone was not behind the ads they saw, but were
misled by the advertisers about Rosetta Stone’s relationship with
them.270 The Fourth Circuit ruled that this was still evidence of
Google’s direct trademark infringement because trademark
encompasses sponsorship confusion in and of itself.271 But in
context, this makes no sense, for it suggests that the mere act of
reselling branded merchandise creates likelihood-of-sponsorship
confusion. That logic would invalidate trademark’s first-sale
doctrine, which holds that reselling branded goods is not in and of
itself trademark infringement.272
If there is a harm here, then, it is in misrepresentations about
Rosetta Stone, and for that the ad copy needs to be considered,
taking us into the realm of false advertising. But because the
calipers used by the court are those of the trademark multifactor
test, the evidence of “actual confusion” generated by an advertise-
ment keeps trademark infringement litigation alive even though
the nominative use of the mark is not what is causing consumer
confusion.273
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/11/google-settles-rosetta-stone-lawsuit-its-last-major-
dispute-over-adwords/.
269. Using trademarks in this manner may also have a generic function insofar as they
may be taken to mean “this product is like” the trademark rather than claiming a closer
relationship. See Grynberg, supra note 68, at 127-28.
270. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 544 (E.D. Va. 2010), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, Rosetta Stone, 676 F.3d 144.
271. Rosetta Stone, 676 F.3d at 157.
272. See supra note 255.
273. To be sure, a trademark qua trademark could be used to create confusion about
sponsorship. The point here is that where claims of direct confusion are already attenuated
(in that we are discussing Google as a direct rather than contributory infringer) and the
confusion stems not from mere branding but rather advertising copy, trademark law’s tools
for assessing confusion are not calibrated to assessing the alleged wrong in this case. 
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3. Developing Safety Valves
The history of domain-name disputes demonstrates the poten-
tial for developing alternative venues for claims that might other-
wise be treated as trademark infringement. As the Internet
developed into a commercial medium, trademark owners turned to
infringement and dilution actions to target so-called cybersquat-
ters and others who won the race to register marks as domain
names.274 Commentary on such claims criticized the courts for
loosening trademark doctrine in a judicial effort to capture per-
ceived bad conduct.275 The zeal to stop cybersquatting swept
broadly, and included cases of nominative use (for example,
TRADEMARKsucks.com).276
New avenues soon opened to which the impulse could be chan-
neled. Congress enacted the ACPA, which allowed mark holders to
demand the transfer of domain names without resorting to a
traditional trademark infringement action,277 and ICANN adopted
private procedures—the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution
Policy (UDRP)—for the resolution of trademarks-as-domain-names
disputes.278
To be sure, the ACPA and the UDRP may be criticized for
expanding the powers available to a trademark holder. Until these
alternative remedies became available, however, it was harder for
judges to resist the urge to “do something” in response to
cybersquatting. The availability of remedies outside traditional
trademark law makes disruptions to standard doctrine less likely.
Courts have more leeway to recognize nominative use interests
when they arise without needing to challenge the premise that
cybersquatting and activities like it are an issue.279 And statutes
274. See, e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998).
275. See generally Hannibal Travis, The Battle for Mindshare: The Emerging Consensus
that the First Amendment Protects Corporate Criticism and Parody on the Internet, 10 VA.
J.L. & TECH. 3 (2005) (collecting examples).
276. See id. at 17-38.
277. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006).
278. Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED
NAMES & NOS., http://www.icann.org/en/help/dndr/udrp/policy (last visited Feb. 26, 2014). 
279. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir.
2010) (distinguishing between trademark domain uses to which trademark holders have
presumptive rights and those to which they do not); see also supra notes 163-65 and
1486 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1429
like the ACPA at least mitigate the accountability issues of courts
taking it upon themselves to adjust trademark law to handle
cybersquatting.
D. Trademark Quality
Thinking about where to place claims is not just about controlling
trademark’s scope or ensuring that novel causes of action have
appropriate safeguards. This inquiry may also promote the smooth
functioning of basic trademark law, as the nominative use example
illustrates.
The inability of courts to offload nominative use claims from
trademark law generates needless doctrinal complications. As
discussed above, courts deal with nominative uses in a variety of
ways.280 Each effort muddies trademark doctrine. In the Ninth
Circuit, development of a separate nominative fair use test for a
time appeared to shift the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the
defendant—creating the paradoxical possibility that a defendant
engaged in a use of a trademark once thought categorically
privileged might face an added burden in seeking to dispose of
litigation in early stages.281 Other cases found it necessary to apply
both the nominative fair use test as well as traditional likelihood-of-
confusion analysis.282
Things are not better in those jurisdictions that attempt to
shoehorn nominative use situations into the multifactor likelihood-
of-confusion test. Here, the problem is that the test did not evolve
in contemplation of nominative use. Some courts respond by
accompanying text.
For all its problems, the creation of a federal dilution cause of action has at least some
potential in this vein. Courts have from time to time treated negative portrayals of brands
as infringement even though the plaintiff ’s complaint sounded more like what we now call
dilution by tarnishment. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema,
Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1979). Enacting a distinct statute allows courts to develop
this body of law in a manner that is less destabilizing to the rules governing infringement
claims. That said, the early returns are not promising. See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v.
Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 395 (6th Cir. 2010) (Moore, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority sanctions
an almost non-existent evidentiary standard and, in the process, essentially eliminates the
requirement that a plaintiff provide some semblance of proof.”).
280. See supra Part II.C.2.
281. The court has tried to correct the impression. Toyota Motor Sales, 610 F.3d at 1183. 
282. See, e.g., Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 905 (9th Cir. 2003).
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applying the factors while keeping the nominative context in
mind.283 Others declare specific factors as particularly germane to
nominative cases, creating the risk that otherwise unimportant
factors might play an outsized role in confusion analysis.284 Another
option is to allow trial courts to adapt the test according to a case’s
particular facts.285 Finally, a court may simply declare certain
nominative uses nonconfusing without explaining when the move
is appropriate or precisely why particular nominative uses are not
confusing. The Second Circuit effectively took this approach in
Tiffany.286
Similarly, courts might address situations that are really about
false advertising but evaluate them using an amended multifactor
test. The Ninth Circuit took this tack in Network Automation, Inc.
v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc., in which the court not only
selected factors to emphasize, but added a new one.287 In addition
to the three factors deemed particularly relevant to the keyword
advertising before it,288 the panel directed the district court to
consider on remand “the labeling and appearance of the advertise-
ments and the surrounding context on the screen displaying the
results page.”289 The opinion illustrates Professor Tushnet’s acid
observation that “trademark doctrine never gets less complex.”290
283. See, e.g., Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 547 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he
traditional likelihood-of-confusion analysis is applicable in a comparative-advertising
situation, but the court should usually consider the nominative-use claim in conjunction with
its likelihood-of-confusion analysis to avoid lowering the standard of confusion.”).
284. See, e.g., Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 225-26 (3d
Cir. 2005) (selecting the factors deemed most relevant to a nominative use situation to be
considered before nominative fair use might be applied as a defense).
285. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 155 (4th Cir. 2012) (acknowledging
the “problems inherent in the robotic application of each and every factor in a case involving
a referential, nontrademark use” and concluding that “the district court did not commit
reversible error in failing to address every factor,” but that future courts “opting not to
address a given factor or group of factors should provide at least a brief explanation of [their]
reasons”). 
286. See supra notes 259-66 and accompanying text.
287. 638 F.3d 1137, 1154 (9th Cir. 2011).
288. These factors were mark strength (which is curious given the nominative
characteristics of keyword ads), evidence of actual confusion, and the type of goods and
degree of consumer care. Id.
289. Id.
290. Rebecca Tushnet, Keyword Advertising Injunction Reversed, REBECCA TUSHNET’S
43(B)LOG (Mar. 10, 2011), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2011/03/network-automation-inc.html. 
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The court left intact an earlier effort at simplifying Internet
trademark cases, deciding that it remained applicable to domain
name disputes.291 The panel never considered the option of simply
exiling the class of cases at issue to false advertising, even though
the new “trademark” factor asks about the message conveyed by
advertising.292
We are left with a mess. Trademark’s proliferation of standards
undermines the reliance interests of litigants and increases the cost
of simply knowing the law.293 Putting what are in essence false
advertising claims where they belong might relieve some of the
pressure.
E. Limiting the Subject Matter of Consumer Information Law
Thus far the analysis considers not whether courts should
consider particular consumer-information claims, but rather how
they should classify them. Thinking about offloading also provides
a basis for questioning whether some claims deserve a home under
any doctrine.
291. Earlier circuit precedent indicated that a “troika” of factors, “(1) the similarity of the
marks, (2) the relatedness of the goods or services, and (3) the simultaneous use of the Web
as a marketing channel,” Advanced Sys., 638 F.3d at 1148, deserved special weight in cases
involving trademark infringement on the Internet. The court limited the precedent, but still
indicated the three were of special relevance to domain name disputes. See id. at 1148-49.
To its credit, the case also scaled back the Ninth Circuit’s earlier overly loose definition of
initial interest confusion. See id. at 1149 (“[T]he owner of the mark must demonstrate likely
confusion, not mere diversion.”).
292. See id. at 1154.
293. Thus far there has not been convergence in application of parts of the multifactor test
to the nominative use situations described above, except for agreement that evidence of
actual confusion is always relevant. Compare Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree,
Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 225-26 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that most relevant factors in nominative
case are “(1) the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the care and attention
expected of consumers when making a purchase; (2) the length of time the defendant has
used the mark without evidence of actual confusion; (3) the intent of the defendant in
adopting the mark; and (4) the evidence of actual confusion”; if those show likelihood of
confusion, then proceed to nominative fair use defense), with Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google,
Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 155-60 (4th Cir. 2012) (reviewing district court findings on disputed
factors of intent, actual confusion, and consumer sophistication), and Advanced Sys., 638
F.3d at 1154 (listing as relevant “(1) the strength of the mark; (2) the evidence of actual
confusion; (3) the type of goods and degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; and
(4) the labeling and appearance of the advertisements and the surrounding context on the
screen displaying the results page”).
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A much-criticized shoot of trademark doctrine concerns approval
claims outside of the sponsorship context. Several precedents enjoin
expressive uses of trademarks for fear that consumers will mistak-
enly believe that the mark holder “goes along” with or otherwise
permits the use.294 Such cases are far afield from traditional
trademark concerns of product source or origin. Any mistake about
the relationship between the trademark holder and the defendant,
moreover, appears to be irrelevant under older conceptions of
trademark policy, as it does not concern the question whether the
trademark holder stands behind the quality of the defendant’s
goods.295
Because an implied statement about the trademark holder (in
other words, the nature of its relationship with the defendant) is at
issue, the false advertising cause of action seems better calibrated
to address any harm. False advertising has doctrines designed to
isolate the message in question and assess whether consumers
perceive it.296 To take one notorious approval case as an example,
what does pouring oil over a representation of the MICHELOB
trademark mean?297 That MICHELOB beer is made from oil? That
it tastes like oil? That MICHELOB approved the rendition of its
marks? That the artist dislikes MICHELOB? That the artist has
something to say about oil pollution? To the extent trademark law
has precise tools, they generally focus on uses of the mark qua mark
294. See, e.g., Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400, 403 (8th Cir. 1987).
295. To be clear, trademark law does address affiliation relationships, but the argument
here is that those are best understood in the context of sponsorship or otherwise standing
behind the quality of the branded product. The discussion here involves broader conceptions
of affiliation that have been argued by myself and others to be either immaterial to a
consumer purchasing decision or addressable by a disclaimer. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 214,
at 2182-83; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory
or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 488-89 (2005). Disclaimers are also an appropriate way
to address what some see as a potential justification of using trademark law to provide for
a merchandising right—for example the Boston Red Sox’s ability to control use of their logo
on merchandise. While the logo does not serve a source-identifying function, in that
consumers are unlikely to believe that the team is the physical source of a baseball cap, as
opposed to being the licensor of the logo, it is conceivable that some purchasers believe that
their funds are going to support the team, which may be relevant for fans who want the
organization to pursue expensive free agents. Disclaimers, or branding as “official”
merchandise, should allow both consumer markets—the market for the lowest price hat and
the market for official teamwear—to coexist. Grynberg, supra note 80, at 103.
296. See supra note 244.
297. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir. 1994).
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in comparison to similar marks. That is the purpose of the multifac-
tor test. Once we move beyond mark-to-mark comparisons and their
immediate context, trademark law’s tools for evaluating meaning
are not particular, allowing essentially any meaning to be policed
if the plaintiff can tell a story of harm.298 The ones told in the
approval context, unlike tales of source confusion, often seem
irrelevant to the purchasing decision.
We could say that this means that trademark law should learn
from false advertising law, that trademark could import false
advertising doctrines, like materiality, that would exclude certain
claims under trademark law.299 True enough. Another option,
however, is to look for ways to move such cases out of trademark
law altogether as a matter of statutory interpretation.300 In other
words, leave trademark doctrine out of it because there is no
trademark claim in the first instance.
This is the offloading argument, but it is problematic here. In
contrast to the nominative use situations described above,301 false
advertising doctrine may not be applicable to these cases. First, an
expressive use might not plausibly be described as being “in
commercial advertising or promotion.”302 Second, courts have
developed standing doctrines that provide threshold barriers to
noncompetitors (and even some competitors).303 Unlike comparative
advertising, therefore, it is not really the case that there is a place
to offload expressive approval claims from trademark law. Once
evicted, many will have nowhere else to go.
298. See id. at 773-75; supra note 244 (discussing differential treatment of implied
falsehoods in false advertising and trademark cases).
299. Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 444
(2010) (“We believe that the best way to achieve balance in cases that do not involve
confusion about responsibility for quality is not to try to fit them within the traditional
trademark framework at all, but instead to think of them as akin to cases of false
advertising.”); Tushnet, supra note 7, at 1353 (arguing that Balducci was wrongly decided
because the claimed confusion was not material).
300.  This could be done by using tools of construction or historical context to discipline
broad readings of the Lanham Act’s text. See Grynberg, supra note 72, at 933-45, 963-67.
301. See supra Part II.C.
302. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
303. See, e.g., Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 697 F.3d 387, 409-11
(6th Cir. 2012) (discussing differing circuits’ approaches). See generally supra notes 133-34
(discussing prudential standing).
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Good riddance. If a claim best fits a particular regime, but that
regime has rules designed to exclude it, that is an argument that
there should be no claim. The Supreme Court embraced this
approach when harmonizing trademark law with other IP laws.
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. turned aside a
reverse passing off claim grounded in the defendant’s repackaging
of public domain material.304 Offloading concerns drove the opinion.
The Court recognized that copyright regulated the subject matter
of the claim, specifically the ability to use documentary film footage.
Allowing trademark to step in would create the risk of upsetting
settled policy tradeoffs in copyright’s realm.305
The fact that copyright law permitted the use of the public
domain footage at issue did not scare the Court into breathing life
into the reverse passing off claim.306 Rather, the existence of a more
appropriate regime for the plaintiffs’ claim helped kill its trade-
mark incarnation.307 The Court’s conclusion that the claim belonged
in another “box” was unaffected by the prospect that that box might
offer no remedy.
Similar analysis should be available with respect to trademark’s
overlap with other consumer information laws. If a regime reflects
the policy choice to exclude claims within the ambit of its subject
matter, peripheral laws should not be rewritten to undermine the
decision. To the extent the initial exclusion is a problem, clean lines
between regimes would make that clear. Thinking about what
trademark law should or should not do is complicated if one does
not know where it ends and other regimes begin.
In a similar vein, proper classification promotes democratic
accountability, allowing legislative and constitutional policy choices
to take effect. As it did with trademark, Congress revised the
Lanham Act’s false advertising provisions to reflect judicial
interpretation.308 The revision was largely designed to provide for
304. 539 U.S. 23, 37-38 (2003).
305. Id. at 33-34.
306. Other copyright claims may have been available in the litigation, however. See id. at
38.
307. See id. at 33-34.
308. Jean Wegman Burns, Confused Jurisprudence: False Advertising Under the Lanham
Act, 79 B.U. L. REV. 807, 820-22 (1999). It should also be telling that the judges who
developed the federal false advertising cause of action felt little need to expand its
parameters beyond commercial speech or address the problems implicated by expansive
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an expansive federal law of false advertising. The drafters were
nonetheless aware of a possible First Amendment collision due to
the Supreme Court’s growing skepticism of commercial speech
regulation.309 Congress therefore restricted the revision to “commer-
cial advertising or promotion,” and by extension the commercial
speech doctrine of the First Amendment, and limited the cause of
action to “false” statements and misrepresentations, which takes
the speech outside the balancing analysis of the Central Hudson
test.310
Trademark law, by contrast, does not have similarly well-
established First Amendment screens.311 The traditional cause of
action’s similarity to fraud seemed to insulate it from First
Amendment scrutiny.312 But trademark’s expansion reaches speech
beyond what may be classified as fraud, rendering trademark’s
“built-in first amendment compass” unreliable.313 One response has
been to try to generate new trademark doctrines to mediate the
potential conflicts.314 A better approach may be to shunt more cases
out of trademark and into false advertising, relying on false
advertising’s built-in checks against claims that reach noncommer-
cial speech. Doing so would also give effect to Congress’s determina-
tion that courts not hear falsehood-focused causes of action based
on noncommercial speech.315
approval-as-permission claims even though false advertising law seems to provide a better
fit for such claims than trademark. This history should give pause to judges who are asked
to consider similar claims at trademark’s periphery.
309. Id. at 830-33.
310. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). If
commercial speech is likely to deceive the public or relates to illegal activity, it may be
banned without the balancing analysis. Id. at 563-64. Otherwise, Central Hudson analysis
asks if the state has asserted a substantial interest, whether the regulation is proportional
to the importance of the interest, and if the restriction is a narrowly tailored one that directly
advances the interest. Id. at 564.
311. 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 31:139 (noting the “buffet of various legal approaches”).
312. Kozinski, supra note 88, at 973 (“Whatever first amendment rights you may have in
calling the brew you make in your bathtub ‘Pepsi’ are easily outweighed by the buyer’s
interest in not being fooled into buying it.”).
313. Id. (“But once you get past the confusion rationale—as I think we should—trademark
law loses this built-in first amendment compass.”).
314. See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (determining that the
Lanham Act should not apply to book or movie titles unless the title has no artistic relevance
or if “the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work”).
315. This is not to say that the screen is without difficulties in application. See, e.g., Kasky
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This argument could be taken to an extreme. The claim here is
not that there is effective preclusion whenever the subject matter
of a consumer information suit is covered by a more narrow
statute.316 Rather, it is that courts should consider the overlaps
between parallel consumer information regimes to prevent claims
at the periphery of one doctrine from undermining policy choices
made at the heart of another.317
F. The Risks of Offloading
Offloading has some potential shortcomings. First, offloading
claims out of trademark law may be used to justify ignoring the
targeted harm altogether. Second, offloading may be done poorly.
Assuming that other doctrines are indeed capable of handling the
offloaded claim may be a mistake. Third, the offloading argument
may assume an autonomy between doctrines that does not exist.
Fourth, classification concerns may be a distraction from achieving
larger policy goals.
1. False Connections
Developments in one doctrine may be carelessly translated
elsewhere, as the Dastar experience demonstrates. The case holds
that the term “origin” in section 43(a) of the Lanham Act merely
identifies the physical source of the product.318 In other words, the
v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2002) (concerning whether Nike’s statements about labor
practices were commercial speech for First Amendment purposes).
To some extent, the commercial speech requirement of false advertising law would be
doing much of the work that a “trademark use” requirement would have done if courts had
embraced efforts to revive (or, depending on one’s point of view, create) the requirement. See,
e.g., Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark Use,” 39
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371, 378-79 (2006).
316. Cf. Ramchandani v. Sani, 844 F. Supp. 2d 365, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (rejecting effort
to dismiss a Lanham Act claim where claims regarding fabric quality were purportedly
covered by a narrower statute).
317. See supra Part II.B.
318. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003) (“We think
the most natural understanding of ‘origin’ of ‘goods’ ... is the producer of the tangible product
sold in the marketplace.”).
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purchaser of a can of Coca-Cola associates the mark with the maker
of the soda and not the inventor of its formula.319
Dastar involved a potential exception to the Supreme Court’s
observation. The plaintiffs accused the defendant of engaging in
“reverse passing off” of documentary footage.320 Because the film
had fallen out of copyright, the plaintiff attempted to use the
Lanham Act’s cause of action for unregistered marks to claim that
the defendant’s repackaging of its footage would confuse consumers
by making them think that the defendant was the authorial, as
opposed to the physical, source of the content when it was not.321
Although consumers may have been unlikely to care about
authorship with respect to the footage at issue in Dastar, the
opinion acknowledges that the “purchaser of a novel is interested
not merely, if at all, in the identity of the producer of the physical
tome (the publisher), but also, and indeed primarily, in the identity
of the creator of the story it conveys (the author).”322 Nonetheless,
the practical difficulties of ascertaining authorship of complex
works like films and the danger of transforming trademark claims
into a form of “mutant copyright” counseled against an expansive
reading of “origin.”323 To hold otherwise would create the risk of
locking up public domain material that was freely copyable as a
matter of copyright policy.
The fact that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act houses both the
false advertising and trademark causes of action creates the
possibility of applying Dastar to foreclose false advertising claims
based on misleading representations of authorship.324 Some courts
have done so. They reason that authorship is not a product
319. Id. at 32 (“[T]he brand-loyal consumer who prefers the drink that the Coca-Cola
Company or PepsiCo sells ... surely does not necessarily believe that that company was the
‘origin’ of the drink in the sense that it was the very first to devise the formula.”).
320. Id. at 27 n.1 (“Passing off (or palming off, as it is sometimes called) occurs when a
producer misrepresents his own goods or services as someone else’s. ‘Reverse passing off,’ as
its name implies, is the opposite: The producer misrepresents someone else’s goods or
services as his own.”) (citations omitted).
321. Id. at 27.
322. Id. at 33.
323. Id. at 34.
324. Dastar explicitly contemplated the availability of a false advertising cause of action
for misrepresentation. Id. at 38 (noting that an action is available where there is a
“misrepresentation under the ‘misrepresents the nature, characteristics [or] qualities’
provision of § 43(a)(1)(B)”).
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attribute, subjecting representations regarding authorship to
Dastar’s preclusive effect.325 This view fails to account for false
advertising’s safeguards against overreach. Courts could navigate
the tension created by Dastar by policing only those claims that rise
to the level of direct misrepresentation, or sharpen the evidence
necessary to establish an indirect misrepresentation of authorship
(which, in any case, could only be actionable if it were also mate-
rial).326
To be sure, allowing a false advertising cause of action for a false
authorship claim without reopening the door to interference with
copyright law requires some subtlety. Small wonder, then, that
generalist judges have allowed Dastar’s trademark holding to leak
into false advertising law. The implication, however, is that
offloading may sometimes be taken too far.
2. False Coverage
Another spillover problem concerns what might be called false
coverage. Judges facing a questionable claim may be more comfort-
able rejecting it if they believe that another doctrine addresses the
relevant policy. That belief may be mistaken. Dastar’s spillover into
false advertising law illustrates the point. As noted above, the case
recognized that consumers may be concerned over false claims of
authorship and other misrepresentations.327 The opinion expressed
confidence that false advertising law can do the work of addressing
these issues:
The creative talent of the sort that lay behind the Campaigns
videos is not left without protection.... If ... the producer of a
325. See, e.g., Romero v. Buhimschi, 396 F. App’x 224, 232 (6th Cir. 2010) (concluding that
a statement about authorship is not a statement about a product’s “nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin” under the false advertising provision of the Lanham Act);
Baden Sports, Inc. v. Molten USA, Inc., 556 F.3d 1300, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[W]e conclude
that authorship, like licensing status, is not a nature, characteristic, or quality, as those
terms are used in Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act.”). From there, courts assume that
Dastar should preclude any claim based on false claims of authorship based on the concern
that the Lanham Act not interfere with the patent or copyright statutes. See, e.g., id.
326. That is that the misrepresentation “is likely to influence the purchasing decision.”
See, e.g., Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 F.3d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012).
327. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
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video that substantially copied the Crusade series were, in
advertising or promotion, to give purchasers the impression that
the video was quite different from that series, then one or more
of the respondents might have a cause of action—not for reverse
passing off under the “confusion ... as to the origin” provision
of § 43(a)(1)(A), but for misrepresentation under the “misrep-
resents the nature, characteristics [or] qualities” provision of
§ 43(a)(1)(B). For merely saying it is the producer of the video,
however, no Lanham Act liability attaches to Dastar.328
While the passage does not specifically address the prospect of
pursuing a false authorship claim under false advertising law, it
makes clear that the opinion viewed § 43(a)(1)(A) and § 43(a)(1)(B)
as distinct. The Court’s trust in false advertising’s scope allowed it
to minimize the importance of false authorship claims. They could
be addressed in another venue. That logic has been at least
partially undermined by the lower courts’ treatment of Dastar.
3. The Illusion of Doctrinal Autonomy
Another objection is that offloading presupposes a doctrinal
autonomy that is impossible for consumer information law. In
particular, trademark may be seen as just a subset of false advertis-
ing law,329 for using a trademark is also a kind of statement about
a product’s attributes. Efforts to isolate trademark from false
advertising law are therefore ill-advised.
However difficult that task is, the game is still worth the candle.
Part of the reason is that the natural countermove, unifying
doctrine, is probably more difficult. Trademark may conceptually be
a subset of false advertising, but too much doctrine has accreted in
their now separate spheres for easy unification in anything other
than name.330 Moreover, the overlap between trademark and false
328. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37-38 (alterations in original).
329. Tushnet, supra note 7, at 1309 (“[T]rademark infringement is a type of false
advertising—a false claim of origin, or perhaps a false claim about a product’s
characteristics.”).
330. Cf. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 299, at 445 (“We think that logically trademark
law can be conceived as a specialized subset of false advertising law. False advertising law
covers a broad range of misrepresentations, not all of which are actionable. Trademark law
focuses on a subset of these misrepresentations—those that involve use of the plaintiff ’s
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advertising should not obscure that they are concerned with
different kinds of communication. It is not surprising that different
doctrines regulate them.331
4. Something Else to Be Wrong About?
A final objection is that thinking about offloading is a diversion
from what matters. If one thinks, for example, that false advertis-
ing law handles implied falsity better than trademark, or vice
versa, then the proper response is to harmonize doctrine in the
preferred direction. Complicating matters with classification efforts
just introduces another potential source of error into the analysis.
Three responses. The first is that this objection ignores account-
ability concerns. For many, respecting existing political settlements
is a value independent of particular policy disagreements. Second,
it is hard to converge on the “right” policy if existing policy is hard
to discern. Proper classification of claims ultimately facilitates the
policy choices that the objection would promote (in addition to
clarifying the law for those subject to trademark law). Third, the
objection begs the question of why we think judges will be effective
at trademark policy. It is at least arguable that efforts at doctrinal
cleanup—while perhaps less important than forays into policy—will
have a higher chance of success. We do not know ex ante, moreover,
whether judges share our policy views. The question therefore is not
if pursuit of nonsubstantive policy goals should trump policy. It is
whether the effort has independent value.
trademark or a simulacrum thereof to brand the defendant’s goods.”).
331. It is true of course that trademarks reach beyond discrete words and symbols. They
also encompass phrases and more detailed communications. Trademark law still tries to
deflect efforts to broaden its subject matter boundaries, limited though they are, in this
direction. See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2000)
(declining to apply trademark protection to a film clip). Similarly, advertisement narratives
also make use of discrete symbols and word marks. But notwithstanding the subject matter
overlap at the peripheries of these doctrines, differing rules evolved at their respective cores.
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CONCLUSION
Trademark’s future development depends in part on how judges
approach it. Two competing visions of the judicial role may guide
them. The first expects judges to actively develop trademark law.
Courts should “continue to interpret” the Lanham Act and the
openly worded section 43(a) in light of its role as plugging “an
important gap in federal unfair competition law.”332 The second
warns that “[b]ecause of its inherently limited wording, § 43(a) can
never be a federal codification of the overall law of unfair competi-
tion, but can apply only to certain unfair trade practices prohibited
by its text.”333 These contrasting views reflect many familiar
debates and tradeoffs regarding the extent to which judges should
make law in the common law style.
Thinking about trademark’s place among other consumer
information laws offers some guidance in navigating between the
two perspectives. To the extent we want judges to pace the law’s
development, contemplating the situation in other regimes helps
maximize the benefits of judicial law making in trademark. At the
least, it reminds us that we need to appreciate the state of play
across doctrines if we are to have a full picture of the policy
consequences of any given rule within trademark. We might go
further to suggest that this kind of doctrinal spillover is reason for
courts to find ways to simplify doctrine so that the interactions
between regimes will be easier to apprehend and calibrate. In this
way the structure of consumer information law suggests that courts
should seek to offload questionable trademark claims as much as
possible.
The offloading argument is therefore simultaneously a structural
argument for trademark reform that would seek to keep certain
expansive claims out of trademark law altogether. Doing so is not
only good for trademark, but offers a benefit to external regimes.
Even if the boundaries separating trademark from alternative
consumer information regimes are porous, paying attention to
332. S. REP. NO. 100-515 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603.
333. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 29 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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questions of fit allows the choices and policies of parallel regimes to
take effect without interference from trademark law’s growth.
